Originally from Luxembourg, he studied and obtained his doctorate in the USA and at the Central European University in Budapest. Florian Biber teaches History and Politics of Southeast Europe at the University of Graz. His doctoral thesis is dedicated to Serbian nationalism "from Tito's death to the fall of Milošević". He carefully follows political events in our region and often comments on them. Because of his critical attitude towards Vučić's regime, he was the target of attacks by local tabloids. He was called a "propagandist" and even a "Djilasov". Marko Đurić, a progressive worker, once asked to be declared i personam non grata because he allegedly "insulted President Vučić".
"WEATHER" On Thursday, when this number "Times" be on newsstands, a discussion will be held in the European Parliament, to put it mildly, irregularities in the December elections in Serbia and the following resolution was adopted. What do you expect to be found in that document, given that we have heard very harsh criticism of the electoral process from some European parliamentarians, and the preliminary report of the ODIHR-and it contained very negative evaluations?
FLORIAN BIEBER: I believe that the resolution will be harsh considering that a large number of parliamentarians who follow events in the Balkans were very critical, not only when it comes to election irregularities but also when talking about the overall state of democracy in Serbia. Those who were milder in their criticism are, at least it seems to me, in the minority. I would expect words of condemnation, as well as perhaps some suggestion of how things can be resolved. I can't predict the details, but some kind of international process is the most logical. No one who deals with Serbia believes that the country's institutions are capable of seriously and professionally dealing with the investigation of irregularities and the improvement of election conditions. The question remains which international actors will be envisaged as mediators, that is, leaders of the process. Perhaps the European Parliament itself will assign itself that role. It can also be the OSCE, that is, one of its institutions, or the Council of Europe. It is not excluded that it will also be the European Commission.
To what extent can the EU and European institutions influence the democratization of Serbia or the improvement of electoral conditions? The results of previous engagements are, is an understatement, modest. It is practically Vučić's rule "prepaid" responded to the resolution with the famous one "So what"!
The European Parliament cannot impose solutions, it is an institution that formalizes attitudes and thoughts in Europe on a certain topic. The government in Serbia can ignore the resolution, but it comes at a price. First of all, its credibility is significantly reduced, especially the credibility of the claim that Serbia wants to become a member of the EU. Those who deal with Vučić's government have known for a long time that it has no motivation to get closer to the EU, but ignoring the resolution will make it official. However, it will be much more difficult for Vučić to ignore the moves of the European Commission, as well as some other signals coming from Europe. As much as the government in Serbia has no intention of becoming part of the EU, it wants to preserve good relations with the EU and its member countries. In this sense, reputation is not unimportant either. With the moves and messages you mention, the government is trying to close the discussion before it even started, to prevent any attempt at an international investigation of the election process. They know that any investigation would significantly weaken her position. However, everything depends on the degree of pressure coming from the EU and European capitals. If he is strong enough, Serbia will have no choice but to either accept international arbitration - or else to definitively and clearly close the door to the EU.
What does that door closing mean?? Some kind of sanctions?
Sanctions is certainly not the word I would use. It is difficult for the EU to introduce sanctions against individual countries because it is a complicated process. The broadest consent of the members is needed, and we know, for example - in the case of Serbia - that Hungary would never support such a move. There is neither agreement within the EU nor political will for sanctions. But there will be political and economic consequences, because both the EU and the governments of Western countries will reconsider the level of cooperation with Belgrade. It is likely that support for Serbia will decrease in many fields.
What is the international position of Serbia in general after the evident very serious December election frauds, after the last illusions that even remotely fair and democratic elections were held in it had disappeared? How much perception changes in circles "decision makers", and how much in general in public?
Every day the matter is clearer - the Serbian government is more of a problem for Europe than it is a partner. We hear that claim more and more often. What is happening in Serbia requires more and more attention and engagement, and this is a problem for the EU in these circumstances. In addition to the election, the "Banjska" case also had an impact on the significant deterioration of the image. At that time, the Serbian authorities showed from the local perception that they are capable of exporting crises and abuses, seriously threatening the security of the region, while using paramilitary formations. These events actually gave a more realistic picture of the Serbian government in the West, and before them many officials were ready to ignore the bad news coming from Serbia. Of course, for many they are nothing new, they are a logical consequence of the process in Serbia that has been going on since the Serbian Progressive Party came to power.
We will return to Banjska.. No, Does anyone still think?, officially or unofficially, that Vučić is the guarantor of regional stability? It seems that since the end of the wars, interstate and interethnic relations in the region have never been worse than today. The Serbian government has a huge share in that, the statements of its officials and the completely renewed nationalist rhetoric of the nineties in the local public. You once stated that an unstable region suits Vučić, something in the sense that he is simultaneously in the role of an arsonist and in the role of a fireman?
His policy involves constantly causing conflicts and tensions. Both he and his party have it easy. They are the heirs of the Serbian Radical Party, based on bigotry, hatred, the narrative of the nineties... Then he suddenly appears as a statesman who advocates for the Open Balkans and better interstate cooperation. Over time, however, the radical side grew stronger, and now it has completely prevailed. At the beginning, after coming to power, Vučić hid it much better.
However, I do not think that this problem - the resurgence of nationalism and inter-ethnic hatred - is considered serious enough outside the borders of the Balkans. It is widely believed that this is rhetoric for internal affairs, that it is not something that should be the subject of diplomatic efforts. The problem, however, is not only of a daily political nature. The promotion of nationalism, hatred, the narrative that everyone is against us, and we are the only right ones, celebrating or commemorating events from the wars of the 12s - all of this leaves deep negative consequences for society and reduces the possibility of reconciliation in the region for a long time. The EU should pay more attention to this because it is a problem that will leave consequences even when the government in Serbia changes. The legacy of the XNUMXs was not only renewed but also strengthened. After a XNUMX-year break, the Balkans are once again living in ethnic trenches.
You studied Serbian nationalism. Has he transformed in the meantime, is it still the key problem of Serbia or is it clientelism and "corruptionism", as some say? Let's say, extreme right-wing parties do not win very many votes in elections; some did not even pass the census in December...
It is true that political parties that are based only on nationalist and populist ideas are not successful in elections. Not only on the December ones, but also on the previous ones. They managed to enter the parliament in 2022, but they did not represent a strong political option. Vučić tried to emphasize their success so that he could additionally position himself as someone who is more moderate and less nationalistically oriented. Milosevic's policy in the nineties was similar. The main role of the Serbian Radical Party was to make Milosevic look like some kind of moderate in relation to them. They were actually useful nationalist idiots. At the same time, nationalism was an integral part of Milosevic's regime: it was not only manifested through the media and statements, but also through concrete decisions. Something similar applies today.
When you read and watch the media close to the government in Serbia, you see that nationalist messages are sent every day, in huge quantities. Nationalism is normalized and even people who don't believe in it eventually succumb to it. It does not mean that nationalists will vote for ultra-right parties. Nationalism is not only expressed through calls to go to war, it is its most extreme form.
Does this mean that Vučić controls almost the entire right-wing political spectrum by normalizing nationalism?
Yes. He certainly wants those who share the views of Dveri and other right-wing parties to vote for him. He therefore sends appropriate messages to such. The problem is that it pollutes the public space, normalizes nationalist messages, which become ubiquitous, and even those who have no nationalist ideas rarely dare to say - it's a lie, it's propaganda. All this leaves, as I said, long-lasting consequences that will be a huge challenge for all subsequent authorities in Serbia and the region.
It has long been common knowledge that the West supports Vučić, looks through his fingers at his collapse of democracy and institutions, as well as the normalization of nationalism - for the sake of solving the problem of Kosovo. Do you agree with that and is it still a current thesis??
Many Western governments had hope after the SNS came to power. Vučić also sent such messages, his government eventually signed the Brussels Agreement. It was believed that he would be ready and capable of such a thing. It was also believed that only a nationalist can solve the nationalist problem. Therefore, it will be much easier for him to make a compromise with Kosovo or even accept its independence than someone from, say, the Democratic Party or some other pro-Western political option. There are still politicians who believe in it, but I think they are in the minority. It seems to me that the pragmatic approach in the sense of "just to make sure it doesn't get worse" prevails now. Let things be as stable as possible, let the problem not increase, and that is enough. They have no hope that he will be ready for a solution but that he will maintain the status quo. It is not ideal, but it is enough, at least for now, while from the positions of the US and the EU there are much bigger problems - such as the Ukrainian war and the war in Gaza. That's what Vučić lives on. In principle, he says: I will fake a conflict a bit, I will send the army to the border with Kosovo, but you can certainly count on me that I will not embark on any war adventure. For now, that is enough for many Western governments, as I said.
photo: marija janković...
Some believe that the recent recognition of Kosovo license plates is a kind of trade by Vučić with the West. This is how the announcement that the construction of the lithium mine will continue is viewed, that is, the work of the powerful company Rio Tinto in Serbia. Are these some "services" which want to reduce the pressure from the West?
Obviously they are. It is through this that you can see that the West also has an influence on Vučić, that is, that it is very important for him to have support from that side. He offers and will offer everything that does not threaten his power. For him, fair and democratic elections are a much bigger threat than a compromise with Kosovo. His power depends on full control over the state, institutions, media and political processes. He will do everything to prevent fundamental changes. On the other hand, he will offer everything else to preserve Western support or at least reduce the pressure. When I talk to some Western officials, I often hear their justification when it comes to their attitude towards the authorities in Serbia. They say: we don't have much influence in Serbia, Vučić doesn't listen to us, if we put too much pressure on him, he will turn to China and the like. They take seriously the threat that he sends little by little: if the West does not want to cooperate with me, I have other partners. However, when we look at his moves, we see that he has an interest in preserving good relations with the West.
You described the situation as seen by the pro-European opposition in Serbia. Hard, also, that there is no substantial support from the West in the attempt to bring about political changes in Serbia, Remove Vučić's regime, democratizes the country and brings it closer to the EU. What would you recommend to the opposition in Serbia?, what to do in such circumstances?
When I talk to Western diplomats, I often hear this phrase: there is no political alternative in Serbia. They say there are no other relevant options, who should we talk to if not Vučić! Therefore, it is important to send a strong message that an alternative exists, in terms of political strength and in terms of political content, that it offers something different and better than what Vučić offers. That there is a possibility of political changes and that they will lead to democratization, European integration and better relations in the region. If the opposition is fragmented and has only 10-15 percent of the electorate, then there is no alternative. We don't like that, we don't like to hear it, but that's how things are from the position of Western politicians. That argument must collapse. The opposition must remain united, work to create a single, strong political bloc. Under two, it must develop good relations with European political parties. They are extremely important actors in making important decisions, but they are also an excellent channel of communication between the Balkan parties and the EU. The SNS built excellent relations with European conservatives, thus gaining a lot of support and reducing the intensity of critical tones. The opposition must build such relations, work hard on it.
Can it be said that the results of the December elections and the unity of the pro-European opposition finally sent a message that there is an alternative after all??
These were the first elections that showed that there is a political alternative in Serbia, a pro-European and pro-democratic one. It is a step in the right direction. Now, as I said, a lot depends on how long the unity of the opposition will last, and it is very important to preserve it. This is not a race of a few weeks or months. It is important that they build infrastructure together, develop communication between themselves, with citizens and with foreign countries... But also that they have a program based on which it will be clear to everyone, both inside and outside the country, that there is a political alternative that is stable and that offers stability. Western politicians often ask me if the opposition in Serbia is really different from Vučić. They say that in relation to Kosovo, for example, they have the same attitude. I do not expect the Serbian opposition to have a clear position on Kosovo, because I am aware of how difficult and sensitive this issue is, but it would have to be precise about other matters. It cannot be a program - we are not Vucic, we want to replace Vucic because he is a dictator, but to clearly state what will happen after his removal. What will the redemocratization of society look like, how will the influence of politics on the media be reduced, how will hate speech be fought and so on. All this must be in the program. Then it will be seen that it is not an opposition whose only quality is that it is united, but that it offers other types of policies that are relevant.
Last year, when was it relevant, You commented on the case. "Spa". This incident is almost forgotten in Serbia today. How do you view him now?? Did he have any consequences? neki, let's say, they relate the shift (resignation) Aleksandra Vulina from the head of BIA-and with this paramilitary action.
I would not comment on Vulin's resignation because I do not know what is behind it, nor whether it will change anything. It is not yet clear what is behind the "Banjska" case, what was the goal, but it is certain that it was an event of high intensity, with a huge degree of violence, which disturbed Western politicians. At that time, many openly asked themselves: is Serbia a firefighter or an arsonist? The level of skepticism and distrust towards Vučić's government has increased. He is not forgotten for sure. The unclear explanation of Serbian officials about what they have to do with the event also contributed to all of this.
I mentioned Vulin., who recently received an order from Russia, namely Vladimir Putin, because he improved and developed the cooperation of the Russian and Serbian secret services. No, I'm not going to ask you to comment on that, but something else. Some tend to exaggerate Russia's influence in the Balkans, and some to minimize. What is your impression? - the extent to which Russia is present in Serbia and in the region, and what are its goals?
Russia's goal is the same as in other regions of the continent: it wants to reduce the influence of the West and/or undermine Western unity, especially within the EU. Russia therefore supports European far-right parties: the National Movement in France, the German AfD and the Austrian Freedom Party. Sometimes it's about money, sometimes it's about support through (pro)Russian media and social networks. Russia wants to develop distrust in democracy and democratic institutions. Every failure of the EU is their success. They don't have any constructive policy, so they don't have any vision of the Balkans either. The Balkans, he himself will admit, are outside the Russian zone of influence and control. What they can do, they can reduce Western influence, through cooperation with some politicians and through media interventions.
I belong to the group of analysts who believe that Russian influence in the region is overestimated. Those politicians who boast of good relations with Russia are generally not very influential, and most do it solely for their own interests. Good relations with Moscow and closeness with Putin correspond to their political agenda and ratings. It gives them importance. Let's say Milorad Dodik is the main politician in an entity that has as many inhabitants as one major European city. So, he is practically at the level of a mayor, but he can take a picture with Putin or Lavrov. Russia relies on partners who pursue their own interests first and foremost.
When it comes to, for example, Russian propaganda, in Serbia it takes place primarily through Russian media, such as Sputnik, Rasha Tudej and some smaller ones, but they are irrelevant. These state officials who send pro-Russian messages are not doing it because of Putin, but because of Vučić.
And one final question.. At one time, because of your critical views on the state of democracy in Serbia, you were attacked by the officials of our country, but also the regime media. Some tabloids call you "with Đilasovec". How do you look at it and does it affect you??
For me, it is only an indicator of the character of the government in Serbia. They do not accept any criticism and immediately launch a counterattack. There is not even an attempt to establish a dialogue. Personally, I don't mind at all when "Informer" or some similar tabloid from Serbia attacks me. I have no consequences. People from my university and my environment don't read it, and even if they did, they wouldn't take it seriously. But if I lived in Serbia, if I worked in an institution there, I might think twice before saying something. Some people do not want or are afraid to be the target of media harangue. I talked about those attacks with officials and diplomats. If this is how they attack a professor at a foreign university who has no political influence, but only analyzes and comments on political processes, how do critics of the regime who live in Serbia get by...
