The government is campaigning, the opposition is in a "bubble"

Research associate of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, political analyst Dejan Bursać received his doctorate at the Belgrade Faculty of Political Sciences in 2019, and his research deals primarily with the topics of electoral and party systems. We talk with him about current topics and dilemmas, in anticipation of the new extraordinary parliamentary elections. After a stormy political spring and a relative summer lull, where is the government, where is the opposition, what are the trump cards of some and which of others?

WEATHER: First of all, let's comment on the last TV performance of President Aleksandar Vučić with all Parisians, spaghetti and yogurt. The performance caused volleys of ridicule on social networks, and some will say that he managed to attract the attention of the wider public again. Who was this show meant for and why exactly at this moment?

DEJAN BURSAĆ: The address was, first of all, intended for his own electorate, that is, to close potential cracks. Vučić is aware that voters have been extremely worried about the rise in prices for several months, practically since last autumn, and that this is something that directly affects them. A drop in standards can threaten the main theme on which SNS has been winning elections for several election cycles - namely the promotion of relatively good results in the economic sphere (which includes investments, employment, and wages), as well as fostering hope for greater prosperity to come. , that is to an even better tomorrow. No one wants to go into a campaign with negative baggage or topics they can't control. After all, remember the previous elections - SNS did everything to "shut down" the issue of Rio Tinto before the start of the campaign, and yet they were surprised by the war in Ukraine, so they had to change their approach.

By addressing this topic directly and very vividly, Vučić practically removes a possible risk before the election campaign, so that he could switch to his standard campaign rhetoric, which, as we know, includes tours of factories, roads, and tunnels without any doubt among voters. The mechanics of it, which have been the subject of ridicule on some social networks, are less important to the effects that dealing with this topic produces among his constituents. Vučić signals that he will take care of something that worries a large number of citizens and thus prevent dissatisfaction. Whether it will really come true, how many products will be discounted, as well as what percentage of meat is in the parisian (and social network users were engaged in this), is absolutely irrelevant from the point of view of political communication.

In the background of the story about cheaper products, Vučić also spoke about the affair "Jovanjica". That Vulin wanted to deal with Inspector Milenkovic, but that he prevented him from doing so, and similarly. To what extent is the affair "Jovanjica" really shook the government's rating, to what extent is she too "crack"?

I am not sure how much voters understand it and how much they are exposed to the whole information. But there is a wider context, where you need to understand what SNS bases its popularity on, which is, as I already mentioned, the socioeconomic consensus of relative well-being. As long as the average voter is convinced that he is economically better off with SNS than with the alternative, such affairs will not have the power to significantly threaten the government. Then when (and if) the standard starts to swing, the frustration of the voters will come to light, where the affairs will be amplified and serve to decrease the ratings. It's not new. Voters were also willing to look through the fingers of the previous government for some affairs and gaffes, but only when the economic crisis hit, those problems came to the fore, because people in such situations were already irritated. That's why, as I said, Vučić cares about ironing out potential cracks in the electorate in the most important, socioeconomic area - so that he can run a campaign in peace in a way that has proven to be successful before, that is, to impose topics on which he can politically profits.

Does this mean that we can unequivocally conclude from this performance by Vučić that the parliamentary elections are approaching? There is a lot of speculation about when the elections will be called. What is your opinion about it? Some claim that it is most realistic to hold all the elections in the spring of next year?

We are definitely entering the period of pre-election rhetoric, but it remains to be seen when the elections will be held. I am inclined to believe that spring is a more rational choice for the government, for the simple reason that regular elections in some 140 cities and municipalities, as well as regular elections for the Assembly of Vojvodina, certainly come then. Every party in power, and unfortunately we have had such a tradition for 20 years, is responsible for calling a higher level of voting on the same date as the local elections - usually extraordinary parliamentary elections. In this way, national themes and national leaders successfully "take over" local narratives and dominate election campaigns at all levels, and thus the ruling party actually improves local results. In political theory, this is called the nationalization of local or regional elections, and it is not something unheard of in other countries. The general trend is that, paradoxically, local topics are less interesting to people than the grand political narratives that are present in the national arena.

In addition, a large budget cycle of investment in infrastructure will end in the spring, when a number of highways, tunnels and railways will be opened throughout the country, and I doubt that SNS will fail to exploit this politically. Finally, it should also be taken into account that spring is traditionally the best period for an election campaign, because voters are less dissatisfied - winter expenses and post-holiday penury are over, nicer weather is coming, people are generally happier, they start planning annual vacations, etc. And what is better than going to the elections with happy voters. The winter campaign is uncharted territory, and the SNS has so far been reluctant to take risks in this regard.

Therefore, the main trump card of the government in the upcoming elections will be socioeconomic issues? How should the opposition respond to that??

Yes, everything indicates that SNS will lead a standard campaign of promoting results in the economic sphere and encouraging hope for an even better tomorrow. It's something we've been seeing for several election cycles and it seems to me that the opposition parties haven't found a way to respond to it. Specifically: for these eleven years now, they should try to understand why a significant part of voters support Vučić, why what Vučić says, offers or does is acceptable to them, and also where there are any cracks in that support.

That is why the total number of votes of the civil opposition has practically not changed since the presidential elections in 2017 until today. The opposition revolves there in a vicious circle of some 800 thousand voters at most and does not expand the circle of support, neither among abstainers, nor among voters of the government. And it seems to me that in that "bubble" there is an established opinion that it is a reasonable approach to be disgusted by Vučić and SNS, and that obviously does not work beyond the mentioned 800 thousand. The real question is how to grab those more than two million voters who support the parties in power - how to convince them that you are an alternative. Moreover, if you treat those voters from the beginning as uninformed and misled, or worse, as stupid, toothless sandwich-makers, you will hardly succeed in communicating with them and conveying your message to them. Simply put, people get off guard when you approach them from above.

When it comes to the progressive electorate, it is usually said that it is divided among those who are in the party-corruption pyramid, that is, those who benefit more or less from the survival of the government, then there are those who are blackmailed in different ways. At the end - we also have people who are insufficiently informed and "understood" 24-hourly propaganda, which for them is inseparable from reality. Do you think this classification is correct?? In general, to which part of the progressive electorate should the opposition "attack"? Or should he give it up, but to focus his efforts on mobilizing as many citizens as possible to go to the polls?

10-03

All that can be said, but I think that in this way we do not explain who actually makes up the main cohort of SNS voters and why they are inclined to support Vučić for 11 years now. Since the economic crisis of 2009–2011. , which left catastrophic consequences for Serbia with more than 400 lost jobs, the entire political spectrum practically turned upside down, including the patterns of voting support. From that moment on, the key issues in Serbian politics are no longer national or foreign-political (although they still constitute strong emotional triggers and occasionally jump to the fore), but economic issues. And when you look at every public opinion survey in the last decade, voters rank employment, wages, living standards, investments among the most important topics... Kosovo, Europe, Russia and the rest - that comes only after that. Of course, it is to Vučić's advantage that the world economy has recovered from 2012 onwards, and he exploited it very well. Only when you understand why SNS has so much support can you work on a long-term strategy. Saying that deceased, blackmailed or brainwashed people vote for them, and that they owe practically their entire electoral rating to fraud, seems to me, with all the respect for the inequality of the political struggle in Serbia and the abuse of institutions that clearly exists, as an excuse to not actually do anything .

Last week, the opposition asked Vučić for extraordinary republican and Belgrade elections by the end of the year, it is - waiting for her request to be fulfilled - decided to block the parliament. How do you evaluate this move and the scenes from the Assembly? Some claim that by blocking the parliament, the opposition managed to shake up the political scene numbed by the summer vacations, and some see it as a desperate move.

I consider that move an unforced political suicide. The protests were obviously conducted without considering the exit strategy, and based on examples from earlier years, the trajectory of the protests during the summer period, as well as the behavior of the authorities, could be assumed. And then, as a way out of that situation where the intensity of protests has decreased, and the government has not backed down, you are looking for early elections. You do all this in a situation where the opposition is mutually divided and not ready to go to the polls, and on the other side, as an opponent, you have a well-established election machinery in every sense - both media and organizationally and materially, and we have seen also thematically. Of course, the dilemma remains how Vučić will respond to that request. On the one hand, I think it is more rational for him to leave the elections for the spring, and on the other hand, he does not want to publicly avoid the "thrown gauntlet" of the opposition.

You talked about the fact that the opposition did not have an exit strategy for the protests, which was followed by the enormous energy of the citizens. Is she "consumed", as some say? Could the opposition have done something?-saved so much, or was it logical to expect that the rebellion would take place over time, no matter what, definitely weaken? How to animate all these people and in what way during this period, which is apparently pre-election?

The demands of the protest, as shown by several public opinion surveys, were reasonable and generally accepted by the citizens who supported them. I am talking about issues of political and media responsibility. Furthermore, in the first period, especially after a lot of clumsy and I would say aggressive statements by the government, which apparently did not understand the mood of the nation after the tragedies in "Ribnikar" and in Mladenovac, there was a solid level of mistrust among SNS voters. This did not translate into a drop in ratings, but a significant portion of voters were affected by what happened and were therefore willing to question official policies more. Unfortunately, the opposition used little of that. You know, there's that saying that the definition of insanity is when you keep trying the same thing and hoping to get a different result. That's what happened with these protests.

And then, without a plan, a way out and any inventiveness regarding the very mechanics of protest or pressure on the government, you turn to the worst solution - seeking an election. After all, didn't Vučić himself in one of the first addresses after the tragedy in "Ribnikar" start talking about the elections, misjudging the mood of the public? He did this precisely because he is aware that elections are the terrain where he takes over the narrative and ultimately wins politically.

Pa, what the opposition should do in order to achieve the best possible election result? Whether "The road to victory", a document that is talked about in public and around which the entire opposition would gather, which would imply the coordinated action of all opposition parties in the fight for fair elections, control of the election process, during the election campaign, something that can be useful?

I think gathering is certainly important, but what kind of image you project before the election campaign is also important. Most voters decide who they will vote for before the campaign, although in Serbia that percentage is somewhat lower due to the fact that the opposition scene is fragmented and most of the parties are of the recent century, so they are not well rooted among voters. Nevertheless, the majority have a general idea of ​​who they will vote for. In such a situation, the campaign serves you to get those potential voters to the polls.

Now let's look at the situation in the opposition: for a year and a half you have been broadcasting disunity, discord and incompetence as the main messages. The People's Party is splitting, the green coalition is splitting, there is a significant level of mistrust between the SSP and other actors, as well as between the People's Party and other actors, and on the other side of the spectrum, even the right-wing parties cannot seem to agree on a joint performance, although they share the same policies and the same electorate. And then, after all that, you say "puj pike is not valid", there are so many columns, now vote for us? Voters have a little longer memory and such behavior does not instill confidence in them.

What kind of relationship should be established between the citizens and the opposition from the right, of the nationalist spectrum? How to protect yourself from imposing pre-election topics that will further antagonize these two groups, and what the regime benefits from? What could be the common denominator of these two groups?

The civic and right-wing opposition are quite distant from each other in terms of values, and the SNS knows this very well. He also knows that without the cooperation of those two groups, there will be no threat to the current government, the percentages of support are simply such. However, the problem for the opposition is that SNS is in the center of the political spectrum and that at any moment it can make moves or publicly launch topics on which the civic and right-wing opposition will diverge. For example, if SNS decides on sanctions against Russia and the unquestioned path to European integration, can you imagine how civil opposition parties overthrow the government with the help of right-wingers who would like to reverse such policies? The same is true in the opposite direction - if the SNS decides to e.g. termination of negotiations with Pristina and turning to Moscow, would right-wingers overthrow that government with pro-European parties for the sake of re-establishing the European path? That is unlikely, and it is a big problem that the opposition parties must solve strategically among themselves, if they intend to replace the SNS in the foreseeable future.

In how many electoral columns should the civil opposition optimally appear?, according to you? Is it necessary to insist on one?

I believe that divisions irritate voters and that they do not make too many differences between the individual parties of the civil opposition, therefore I think that one column is certainly more logical, provided that there are no public divisions within it, and that, as we can see, is not certain. All this creates a problem for the public image of the opposition. If you cannot show people that you are able to seriously and competently lead the pre-election coalition, why do you expect them to trust you to lead the country?

For the end, of course, it is unrealistic to expect that election conditions will improve. The opposition for now, at least according to what we hear, does not talk about the possibility of boycotting the elections. No, should she still turn out to be something they would be "red lines"?

I am not sure what the opposition can threaten. They are aware that the boycott of the 2020 elections was disastrously realized, poorly politically exploited, without international reaction, and that a part of the opposition parties was thereby reduced to a beggar's stick, making it impossible for them to receive institutional funding that comes from their presence in parliament and local assemblies. A renewed threat of boycott would therefore be a quickly read bluff. In such a situation, it remains to turn to those aspects of the electoral process that you can influence - first of all, I mean election control, pressure on regulatory institutions and the like. However, in the current debate about the number of columns, I am not sure how many actors are seriously and thoroughly dealing with these issues.