Recently adopted amendments and additions to the systemic public prosecutor's and judicial laws, and especially with the additional amendments that became an integral part of the changes, the independence of the public prosecutor's office is fundamentally changed. In the public, rightfully so, the most attention was attracted by the amendment terminating the referrals of public prosecutors who now work in all public prosecutor's offices, thus also in Public prosecution for organized crime. With that change, these public prosecutor's offices will be without all referred prosecutors within 30 days, and it is uncertain when future elections or referrals will be possible.
However, a much deeper essential change refers to the way of working and the relationship between the public prosecutor acting in the case and the chief public prosecutor, i.e. the head of that prosecution. Namely, until now, public prosecutors could lodge an objection to the five-member Commission due to their personal opinion that the manager's mandatory instruction was illegal or unfounded. High Prosecutorial Council. Composed of extremely experienced and high-ranking chief and public prosecutors, that commission would, after careful consideration of the factual situation, make decisions on contested instructions by voting. Practice shows that some instructions were canceled and some were confirmed, regardless of who was the main public prosecutor who issued such a mandatory instruction.
Now that is no longer the case. Deciding on the legality and validity of the executive "order" returns to the hierarchical decision-making of the individual, in this case the superior of the chief public prosecutor. I believe that this legal solution, which, in truth, formally follows the constitutional provisions on mandatory instructions, essentially discourages and reduces the independence of the public prosecutor who acts in a certain case.
The changes concerning complaints about the annual schedule of work in the public prosecutor's office, which are brought by the chief public prosecutor, are of additional concern. Until now, a public prosecutor whose job position within a particular public prosecution office was changed could file an objection directly with the High Council of Prosecutions. With the amendments to the law, this was changed, and instead of the Council, the decision on this objection is also made by the superior chief public prosecutor. The provision on what happens if the superior body, now the superior manager, does not make a decision within 30 days has also been fundamentally changed. Instead of the previous provision that the objection is considered accepted, it is now considered rejected. In practice, this means that if, for any reason, the superior manager does not decide on the merits of changing the position of the public prosecutor who objected, the objection will be considered rejected, and the decision of the head of that prosecutor's office confirmed.
Significant changes have also been made to the possibility of choosing and appointing chief public prosecutors and acting officials, i.e. heads of public prosecution offices. The previous restrictions on the number of electoral mandates have been abolished, and the mandates of incumbents have been extended with the possibility of renewal. In a negative sense, the provision that stipulates that if the High Council of Prosecutions does not make a decision on the appointment of the acting chief public prosecutor within 30 days, the immediately higher manager makes that decision instead of the Council is particularly interesting. Bearing in mind the proven obstruction of the work of the High Council of Prosecutors during 2025, especially when it comes to elections and appointments, it seems that this provision was adopted precisely in order, counting on the obstruction of the Council's work, to free the hands of superior bosses to appoint people of their own discretion as heads of lower public prosecutor's offices. Although, at first glance, such a mandate is limited until the election of the chief public prosecutor and for a maximum of one year, there is no obstacle to repeating that mandate.
I consider the provision that prescribes consent to be additionally problematic and contrary to the Constitution Ministry responsible for justice in connection with the legally prescribed competences of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office for the performance of international cooperation matters of importance for the Public Prosecutor's Office. Given that this provision is prescribed without limitation or further clarification, it can be interpreted as necessary. It may also be necessary to consider that such consent must be obtained in cases of international legal assistance handled by the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office. These cases also include the actions of the public prosecutor for liaison in the institution for rapid criminal justice cooperation Of the European Union - Eurojustice, which refer specifically to international cooperation in the handling of individual cases between domestic and foreign public prosecutors' offices.
This provision is in direct contradiction with the provision of Article 155, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, that no one outside the public prosecutor's office can influence the public prosecutor's office and the holders of the public prosecutor's office in handling and deciding on a particular case.
THE GREAT LEAP BACKWARDS
The amendments to the law regulating the organization and work of the Special Prosecutor's Office for High-Tech Crime, which now completely submerge it in Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade. Instead of the hybrid prosecution-department leaving the status it had until now by passing a new law, the draft of which was sent by the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office to the Ministry of Justice about two years ago, and which provides for the establishment of a public prosecution full of special jurisdiction for high-tech crime, such as JTOK and JTRZ in their respective areas, we see that the current solution represents a leap, not a step backwards. Specialization is practically abolished, and the department is reduced to one of the departments of the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office, which no longer has its independence, but is expressly under the control of the chief public prosecutor of the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade.
Without going into the further listing and analysis of the remaining amendments to the Public Prosecutor's System Laws, which would require a separate space, I think it is necessary to start the process of assessing the constitutionality of several provisions of these laws, the implementation of which will begin in the coming days. What is certain is that the adopted amendments represent the complete deletion and negation of almost all changes established by the Constitution and accompanying laws from 2022 until today, and which leave the provisions of the Constitution on public prosecution, practically, in the state of an empty shell.
The position of international representatives, especially the European Union, both in Brussels and Belgrade, has been publicly announced and repeated several times. Unfortunately, these and thus adopted changes to system laws in the judiciary are seen as an extremely significant step backwards which is against practically all parts of the Agreement on Stabilization and Association with the European Union and the accompanying Action Plan in Chapters 23 and 24 that concern public prosecution. What this will mean specifically going forward is not entirely clear. In particular, the claims remain unclear that after the adoption and implementation of these laws, there will be consultations, joint work and obtaining the opinions of relevant domestic and international institutions. Such an approach is taken before the adoption of laws, not after, when their implementation already has its effects. Because of the above, I am skeptical about the reach of those post festum actions.
The rule of law is a principle regulated by the Constitution, which rests on the pillars that include free elections, human rights, separation of powers, independent judiciary and government's compliance with the Constitution and the law. On the example of the conducted elections for the members of the High Prosecution Council from the prosecutorial ranks, I can say that I am deeply concerned. Elections that were unanimously determined to be successful and without any objections during the election day by all competent authorities for the implementation of elections, were annulled. The electoral right to elect three legally and legitimately elected public prosecutors was taken away and threatened, and with them the majority of the chief and public prosecutors who voted for them as the winning candidates. In its decision on appeals filed by only six prosecutors out of a total of 740 who voted, the Constitutional Court did not at all consider the essential violation of the electoral right, but, ignoring the most important parts of the electoral procedure, made the decision on the basis of post festum isolated and not overall procedural facts. Every regular court is obliged to comprehensively and fully consider all the circumstances of the case and to evaluate all the facts, not only individual ones, and to make a decision in such a way. My view is that this was not the case here. How grotesque the whole situation is is perhaps best shown by the fact that 0,68% of the total number of voters failed to vote in 50% of the polling stations for higher and basic public prosecutor's offices.
UNCERTAIN FATE OF CASES RUN BY JTOK
The Public Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime has already very clearly informed the public that due to the termination of the referral of 11 of the 20 working public prosecutors, there will be a collapse in their work. Public prosecutors who remain working will have their workload increased by more than 100% in a very short time. It should be borne in mind that these are extremely complex cases with, sometimes, tens of thousands of pages of evidence and facts. Although I have an extremely good opinion of all the public prosecutors in that prosecution, I do not think that they possess such superhuman powers that they can overcome such an additional burden without any problems. On the contrary. This leads us to the conclusion that the changes, which are justified by the fact that they should improve the work of the public prosecutor's office, in this case will certainly worsen that work.
Based on all of the above, I think that these legal changes were made to turn back the clock, before the constitutional and legal changes of 2022, and very likely more than five decades ago, during the time of the Soviet-style prosecutorial monocracy. I am deeply concerned about the ultimate strengthening of the role and control of the chiefs in the prosecutor's offices, placing the entire internet space under the close control of one manager, a systemic environment in which objections to illegal orders are resolved within the framework of the hierarchy and not in a collegial professional body, the creation of a system of uncertainty and dependence of public prosecutors through unlimited referrals and appointment to acting positions instead of elections. The consequences of the application of these laws will be visible soon, and I think that it will show how serious work, consultation, public discussion and international experience in changes to systemic prosecutorial and judicial laws are lacking in this case.
The author is the president of the High Prosecution Council
