Instructions for use

Belgrade, November 08 - 16, 2024.
telephone survey, representative sample,
1000 respondents

This article is a continuation of last week's article about the political mood of the citizens of Belgrade, in which we conveyed and analyzed the views on some specific topics concerning the capital (traffic, the bridge, the Expo, the mayor), as well as political life in Serbia in general.

Research is from November and, so to speak, "old" for a month. Admittedly, it was done after the canopy tragedy, but before this student protest, which introduced a new dynamic into Serbian political processes. The published text did not contain party or personal ratings. He was announced once short news on the portal "Vremena" and published in print. But, despite that, he was noticed and, of course, spat on in the regime media, and even (and not just once?!) by the Master himself.

I honestly wondered - why? That is, what's in the middle. And it seems to me that (not counting psychological factors) there are two main reasons. First and foremost: The President cannot bear that there is anything, any institution, important or unimportant, any media, research agency, anything, big or small - that he does not personally control. And that is probably his biggest problem with NSPM, as well as the newspaper in which the said text appeared.

The second point is somewhat more specific, although also related to the first. Namely, Vučić knows that, after lithium and the canopy, he can't really "bloom flowers" (not even a rating) in his (m), that is, SNS "company". We can talk about specific figures (even the scale of the fall, whether it is mild or serious) in one way or another. But with his senseless and aggressive attack, Vučić tried, and partially succeeded, precisely to nip it in the bud, as well as any meaningful, uncontrolled by him debate on the topic of ratings.

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PREVENTIVE STRIKES

What do the party ratings (especially the opposition's) mean when it is perfectly clear that in the next elections - when and if there are any - probably neither the government, nor the opposition, will come out even close to this format and this fragmented? This does not mean that they will be unique (as the absolute majority of opposition-minded voters want and expect), nor that possible opposition columns will be optimal and logical (probably not). But, at least because of the instinct of survival and self-preservation, "every lice party" will definitely not go well.

So ratings don't mean much right now. Especially not the relatively small, sometimes even microscopic, mutual differences in the size of opposition political actors. But it means a lot when you see that, despite the court mantra of "historical rating", as well as the triumph in those unfortunate June elections, the ruling party in the capital has 36 percent of support, and that with all the traditionally (un)reliable partners from the SPS, they have totaling, at most, some 41-42 percent.

And Vučić himself probably knew that the rating was more or less like that (and for Serbia, as I said, add a maximum of 4-7 percent and that's it) - and that's why he attacked us as a precaution. So that when we publish the ratings and figures, he can say: "Well, that doesn't matter, those are fraudsters, who don't work but invent results".

But now there is one important note, which is why I didn't want to release any party and personal ratings without even a short accompanying text. Of course, neither that nor any other accompanying explanation will prevent the President's criticisms and attacks. There is no such explanation that will appease or satisfy the regime's Taliban and bots when they receive a directive or when they feel threatened. But it is important that at least those who are interested and well-intentioned get as correct information and picture as possible.

SEPARATE OPPOSITION GROUP

Even some personal and political friends are often not happy about our results. And the main reason for that dissatisfaction (besides sometimes unrealistic expectations) lies in the item "opposition, but I don't know for whom", which we reformulated in recent months into "certainly against the government, but I don't know exactly for which party". But the essence is the same. Namely, for a long time there has been a relatively stable block of some 15-20 percent of respondents who, according to their own statement and their positions on specific issues, are clearly and unequivocally anti-regime-minded, but they do not have a firm, or, rather, almost none opposition party identification.

As I said, they are clearly oppositional, but (at the moment?) they are not party-declared. There are certainly among the readers of this text. Vlast and Vučić are not tolerated the same, or maybe even more than "ordinary" opposition voters. But they are picky, capricious, often disappointed, or, on the contrary, too optimistic to be satisfied with a concrete political offer. Treating them as ordinary "abstainers" and people without a political stance is simply not true and not fair. But, if we were to treat them like that (as "undecided"), as some agencies and colleagues do, then their percentages would be proportionally distributed to all political actors (which means mostly to the SNS, although the opposition parties would also get a little bit). and everyone would be happy. However, we treat them as a separate opposition group until some election is near. And then we will see if in the end they will be "ordinary" abstainers (and thus make Vučić happy) or if they will join some opposition matrix.

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As for ratings, they may not be more reliable, but they are certainly a more informative political indicator than "bare" ratings. But they also require a certain interpretation and additional explanation. Because, at one time, high party ratings, mass gatherings and collective euphoria at the mention of his name did not recommend Vojislav Koštunica as the frontman of the coalition that, at the end of the ballad, in the autumn of 2000, would defeat Milošević. There was literally none of that. But he was recommended by the "average ratings", but even more - and above all - by far the lowest number of "units" compared to the other challenger candidates, and it's not that there weren't any, and they weren't at all pointless.

I personally knew some of the people who participated in that "selection", and I was friends with one of them. And he literally told me the following: "There was no need for any great philosophizing." As soon as we saw the grades, it was clear that Voja was the one. And it was clear to Zoran as well". (So ​​much for the mantra, popular in some circles, how, at that moment, "anyone could beat Milosevic". Well, he didn't.)

But let's leave aside the discussion on the topic of "what would happen if it happened" (but maybe also "what will happen when it will happen"). I recalled that summer almost a quarter of a century ago just to illustrate how important grades are, often even more important than the current rating. But there, too, things have changed somewhat. And that too for the worse.

Vučić's regime has almost limitless resources and an even more inexhaustible will to (mis)use and use these resources to slander political opponents, as well as all those who at some point stand in the way of his omnipotence. That is why, unfortunately, it is not a mere phrase and it is not an alibi if we say that the joint media-political machinery would probably demonize even one Patriarch Pavle in a matter of hours - or in a few months - as, after all, they periodically did with his close associates. and great clerics like Metropolitan Amfilohi and Bishop Athanasius, when they opposed them in connection with the Brussels Agreement and the surrender of northern Kosovo.

OPPOSITION ORDER

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What does this mean in the context of our research and our scorecard? Well, for starters, average grades (and grades in general) mean almost nothing anymore, because the SNS army evaluates in the same way as it votes. Therefore, "Give me five, they all have one (or zero, if possible, necessarily zero)". And especially those who at some point stand out as acute or potentially dangerous to the regime. Which means that the avalanche of negative ratings received by regime voters can be treated as a kind of opposition order.

I want to say that there are fewer and fewer nuances in evaluation, and precisely the nuances were important here. That is why, for example, Ana Brnabić has slightly lower ratings than Aleksandar Vučić, even though their political profiles and sizes are, to put it mildly, like heaven and earth. And that's why, say, Vučić's old-radical, xenophobic and homophobic voter "ič" doesn't mind Ana's minority ("Croatian") NGO or LGBT background. Because Ana is "ours". That is, "Acina". And Aca is "ours", that is, theirs. And they are his.

In contrast to that phalanx, there is a rather diffuse, wavering and dispersed opposition body, more or less skeptical of all opposition leaders and in a desperate (and in the given context naive) search for the so-called with a "new face" that will finally deliver them from the progressive dictatorship. And that "new face", if it appears at all and at some point threatens to threaten the ruling order, will instantly become "old", that is, it will be dragged through the regime's tabloid mud and end up in the same pot with the rest. opposition colleague.

That's why we have to admit that Vučić almost succeeded. Or he was very close to succeeding completely. Not to realize his megalomaniac dreams of greatness and "historical significance", but to permanently and definitively ruin, divide, dumb down, poison and divide the citizens of Serbia. His reference to "decent Serbia" seems literally grotesque in the context of the way he came to power and the way he rules, i.e. remains in power.

If, from time to time, for tactical reasons, he had to change his performance and rhetoric to some extent, he did not change his strategy and methodology at all, except that he improved and adapted them technically. And the production of enemies, verbal aggression and media manipulation were and remain the foundation, pillar and crown of that "policy". In which the only real change was that, due to historical circumstances, that is, due to the fear of getting hit on the nose again by the global powers, he had to feign "cooperativeness" - and to reorient himself from the "external" to the "internal". enemy.

And his "ferceralo" is almost perfect. But it is the nature of such systems to be porous and fragile. That is, even when they are apparently perfect, they unexpectedly easily collapse and break in a collision with some sudden problem or anomaly in the matrix. Whether the problem is called "canopy", or whether it is called "students".

The author is the editor-in-chief of NSPM