On the 21st anniversary of the assassination of the first democratic prime minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, his mural on the plateau in front of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade was desecrated. And it's not the first time. Maybe one can guess who is behind this idiotic act, maybe not, but by doing so - in general - many could have inspiration. And those from the ultra-nationalist-clerical political wing and those who are committed to the so-called ultra-left, anti-globalist ideas (the written message, under the red paint that covered Đinđić's face, sounds like that). Not only in Serbia, those two options are sometimes not so infinitely ideologically distant from each other. This can best be seen here in relation to Đinđić's legacy. And by God, also according to the "strange" attitude towards Vučić's omnipotence.
However, the activists of the ruling party could do it comfortably, not to introduce additional "confusion" into the proverbially confused public, but more because - regardless of the official positions of Vučić and his associates - Đinđić is still perceived as a political arch-enemy, a man who "delivered Milosevic to The Hague", "called for the bombing of Serbia" (that propaganda falsehood somehow managed to successfully survive all this time) and at least temporarily stopped Serbia's dream path to Moscow and Minsk, that is, he turned towards the always "hated West". However, if there are no big surprises, the perpetrators will never be discovered.
REVERSE-LIGHTS
In accordance with Serbia's current civilizational reversal, this barbaric act symbolically, in retrospect, illuminates the important elements and context of Djindjic's short-lived political career. Although it may seem to some that it lasted for decades, in fact less than 14 years passed from the founding of the Democratic Party, when he entered the political arena, to his murder. He was Prime Minister of Serbia for just over two years (three times less than Ana Brnabić). Despite this, the mark he left, both in politics and in society, is impressive and still causes outpourings of both negative and positive emotions and will continue to do so for a long time. Regardless of the fact that both before and after there were political figures who had incomparably greater power than him, Serbia never actually managed to give birth to a figure as strong as Đinđić, who combined an impressive intellectual dimension and inexhaustible political energy. and managerial talent. Each of his public appearances, and there were not many of them and they were not long, is more significant in terms of content than the 12-year-old daily "addresses" of Aleksandar Vučić. And it says even more about our present than all the presidential soliloquies.
On March 12, 2003, Serbia hit a wall. Still, dazed and confused, she turns around. And she still doesn't understand what actually happened, and especially why what happened happened. Perhaps the intention of the assassins, that is, the creative directors of the murder, was exactly that. Serbia had to stop, and Đinđić, to paraphrase TV star and man who spent more of his life in prison than in freedom, Kristijan Golubović, had to be "killed". If not on March 12, then on another day.
BETWEEN AT LEAST THREE FIRES
In the last years of his political career, and especially after the October 3th changes, Djindjic constantly found himself between several fires that he sometimes successfully avoided, and sometimes, unfortunately, not. Certainly, his original opponents were nationalist activists, supporters of Milosevic's autocracy, Milosevic's elite, opponents of democracy, liberal values and, of course, the West. He personified what they feared: reforms primarily of the political and institutional, and even the economic system, the establishment of a functional ("completed") state that will be based on the so-called western values. Most of them were not bothered by the West (only) because developed democratic countries were against Milosevic's war conquests, "solving the Serbian national question" by force, violence and crimes, and not even because of the "bombing of Serbia and Čačak" (as the title of the Let XNUMX album reads ). The main problem is still relevant today: Serbia's approach to the European Union would threaten the ossified power structures that live so beautifully on the backs of citizens. And some of them could even end up in the bajbok.
Those structures certainly include, apart from Milosevic's cultural and economic elite and parts of the secret services, some religious dignitaries, as well as members of organized crime, which experienced stellar moments in the 1990s. Like today, after all. From time to time we will remind ourselves of one of Djindjic's statements from the period when his party was in the opposition. To the journalist's critical question, he roughly answers that the opposition in Serbia does not operate in Switzerland but in a ruined state, in a society turned into a furnace, in which all values are set backwards. It could also be read like this: the opposition is forced to make certain compromises and "deals" with parts of the so-called power structures and dominant value patterns in order to create the elementary preconditions for Milosevic to go into the political past. We are entering the zone of assumptions and twilight because it is difficult to untangle credible information from gossip, but it is clear that the downfall of Milošević was preceded by an agreement of the opposition, first of all, with those powerful groups that, for various reasons, he and his irrational politics began to bother and get on his nerves.
Some say that these agreements, which were apparently necessary, were the prelude to tragedy. Some deny it. The former say that those powerful groups felt cheated when Djindjic, contrary to the agreement, really began to implement reforms in depth and breadth, targeting key points, and that the entire Milosevic elite united again. Against him. And because of that, he had to be "killed".
What was going on there, what exactly were the roles of secret services, underground structures, Kostunica's entourage, and even some of Djindjic's entourage? We got some answers from the relevant publications and court processes. But more seriously, more precisely, perhaps sometime in the future, historians will give. Although it will be too difficult a job for them, especially if they don't get out of their own ideological positions. Be that as it may, Djindjic was formally killed by the state.
OTHER SIDES
According to the same principle that Vučić's criminal-violent government and propaganda of an identical character declare the opposition and critical public figures to be criminals and thugs, the media in Serbia shortly after October 5 began to declare Đinđić a "mannequin of organized crime". It was actually a prelude to liquidation. Many believed in it, but on March 12, they broke down. Some of them then felt guilty. She has not left some of them even today. By the way, there has never been more media freedom in Serbia, before or since, than during Đinđić's time. Even Beba Popović could not do much there.
Of course, the attacks did not come only from that side, the nationalist-war-mongering-criminal side. Admittedly, with somewhat less intensity, slaps echoed from the left-liberal side, even from the coalition partners and their associates. Suddenly, an incredibly large number of experts appeared on this part of the scene who knew everything about the transition, complex system reforms, international relations, what should be done, what should not be done. It's as if they were longtime advisers to Zbigniew Brzezinski and Jeffrey Sachs at the same time. They roughly believed that a torn country could be rebuilt in about two months. That's about how long it has been since the formation of Vučić's government when those experts determined that "everything is the same, only he is gone." Some of them are still present on the public stage and are now lecturing the opposition on what it should and should not do. Criticism is always welcome, of course, but when it is thoughtful and based on knowledge and facts.
We learned from those circles that Đinđić is a nationalist and the most dangerous, hidden one. They recalled the "roasting of an ox on the Pale" (remember, Đinđić visited Radovan Karadžić during the war in order to try to convince him to accept the peace plan in the context of the formation of the so-called Carter Commission), sharply criticized the introduction of religious education in schools and public communication with some of the "national fathers"... They criticized him for being pragmatic. As if pragmatism is not a prerequisite if you want to seriously engage in politics. If you don't want to shut yourself in four walls with like-minded people and pat each other on the shoulders. Perhaps if he had been more pragmatic, in the sense that he subordinated fundamental principles to personal interest, perhaps he would not have had to be "killed". Seen from this distance, during the government of Zoran Đinđić, inter-ethnic relations in the region relaxed rapidly and were better than ever.
And after the murder, the situation changes. Suddenly, Đinđić declared himself the leader of the "other Serbia", the anti-war and anti-nationalist one. It would have been better if, instead of an afterthought, they had given Djindjic at least as much time as they gave Aleksandar Vučić at the beginning of his European and Kosovo career, in the period when he referred to Djindjić's legacy. The one who recognized Zoran Đinđić in the personified Vučić will face a special circle of hell in which subscribers will be forced to listen to the current president's speeches all day long.
PRESSURES FROM THE WEST
Zoran Đinđić's "Kosovo policy" also bothered certain circles. Let us remind you that Đinđić believed that the solution to the problem must not be postponed because time is not working in favor of Serbia. He was, of course, right, and honestly, he shouldn't have been a political genius to conclude that. It is clear that he could not untie the Kosovo knot with the political power he had, he was aware of that. He must also have been aware that Serbia had to establish normal communication with the Kosovar Albanians at least twenty years earlier and search for a solution together with them. He himself said that national issues cannot and must not be solved by force. It turns out that he was right about the need to address the problem. We see it 21 years later: Serbia is a hostage of its own policy towards Kosovo and will be for a long time.
The West unequivocally supported the overthrow of Milosevic's regime. But one gets the impression that he didn't give Djindjic much time either, that he was constantly panting down his neck. And years later, he gave Vučić all the time in the world and everything that goes with it. Let's remember the very active participation of some Western ambassadors in Serbia's post-October 5th politics: some of them really got into trouble and did a lot of damage.
Of course, Đinđić also made a lot of mistakes, there is no doubt about that. Something self-initiative, something under pressure, something at the persuasion of colleagues. On the other hand, he created a kind of political miracle, he managed to return Serbia from nothingness to the ranks of civilized countries in record time, despite the fact that his party had a rating of only 12 percent, and his popularity was even lower.
Some will say that perhaps his biggest mistakes were in choosing the people he surrounded himself with, many of whom became unquestioning followers of Vučić's regime, showing their "Hajd" face. Others reply that during the time of Đindjić, they had a certain function, and that with his death, they became headless vagrants who were looking to get their hands on something as soon as possible so as not to be ostracized. Some tried to use "Đinđićism" to create a party and a new political career, but they soon showed that they were not up to it. Those odysseys ended tragically.
On the other hand, Tadić's Democratic Party elegantly tried to shake off Đinđić's legacy. It may have paid off in the short term, in terms of rebranding and increased ratings, but in the long term it turned out to be a move that led to total collapse. Both parties and Serbia.
photo: Zoran Zestić / TanjugANNOUNCED, PROMISED, FORGOTTEN: Vučić will lay the wreath as Prime Minister on March 12, 2017;…
VUCIC AND DJINDJIC
Đinđić gave a brief definition of the Serbian Radical Party and radical politicians, and consequently the Serbian Progressive Party and the progressives, temporarily disguised Sešeljevics. It is more relevant today than ever. According to him, they are dangerous for the state because they are not ashamed of anything, because they lower the level of public and political life to such a depth that decent people run away from that politics. He anticipated the present: "And then you will have politics at the lowest possible level of civilization, where the difference, the border between honor and dishonor, between truth and lies, between facts and slander, between what is shameful and what is decent, is completely erased. And then you are up to your neck in mud and then they say: come and discuss. Come and discuss on our ground - in mud up to your neck".
After coming to power, Vučić tried to profit from the post-Đinđić sentiment, a little for internal and a little for external needs. With that feint, he attracted parts of the DS, some influential public figures of the civil option, Djindjic's coalition partners, including representatives of national minorities. He actually made it easier for them to change into a neo-radical jersey, and the transfer always carried with it certain affiliations, not small ones. According to the rules of political theory, all parties of civil, liberal orientation that entered into an open deal with Vučić dematerialized. In fact, Vučić tried to dematerialize Đinđić's legacy in the long term. It seems he didn't make it though.
Even if, like in some sci-fi movie, he really wanted to follow Djindjic's path, he wouldn't be able to. Just like some rural soccer player-thug who drinks a case of beer a day at the mechanic and beats his wife and children when he comes home in the evening - he will never be Lionel Messi no matter how much he wants to be. The only thing left for him in that case, Vučić did: he turned the state into a local party.
After the quasi-reform phase, Vučić quickly shook off Đinđić and European stories. It is true that members of the government go out for a cigarette break and bow down at the place of Djindjic's murder, but the attitude towards the late prime minister is actually best seen from the regime's media. Đinđić is killed again, thoroughly and systematically. The basic thesis, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, reads: Đindjić was liquidated by the West, because... So add what you want. Because he wanted to seize Kosovo again or because he was generally not humble like the current opposition. Like Vučić, he is not humbled, so he is also threatened with liquidation. Every day. Therefore, Đinđić and Vučić meet in the regime media on this issue. Vučić, however, somehow manages to survive massive assassinations.
There is, of course, the third bullet theory. We can, for example, read in "Večernji novosti" that Đinđić practically killed himself. Namely, he and his associates wanted to raise their ratings with an unsuccessful assassination attempt, but the bullet still ended up in the prime minister's heart, destroying the surrounding organs, due to an inconvenient set of circumstances.
photo: printscreen...sketch of the monument to Đinđić in front of the Faculty of Philosophy
WAITING FOR A MONUMENT AND A SERIES
During the Maxweber period, probably in 2016, Vučić announced that a monument to Zoran Đinđić would be erected very soon. He was supposed to be unveiled in the Student Park in Belgrade on the 15th anniversary of the assassination, more precisely on March 12, 2018. And 14 Eids have passed since then, and nothing! Allegedly, they are waiting for the urban planning green light, because the reconstruction of that part of the city is planned. In the meantime, the progressives destroyed half of Serbia and built buildings and some monuments, and the urban planners didn't even give a hoot. They did what they were told. If they had been told, they probably would have personally illegally demolished buildings and placed plaques in the squares. Vučić no longer needs Đinđić, and he does not need a place where Đinđić's admirers will gather. Because they are now his enemies, whom he would prefer to expel from the country.
Series Saber, produced by RTS, was supposed to be broadcast from February 24 onwards. Look at the strange circumstances: not for a political reason, but for some completely different, joyful reason, it is being prolonged. She was allegedly invited to one of the most prestigious film and serial content festivals, so she has to wait. Some, however, say that all this looks like political censorship. We don't think that the series will thoroughly cover the neuralgic points of the assassination, nor will it deal with the political background, but maybe it accidentally scratched something that it shouldn't have, especially in this "sensitive political moment". So it is temporarily, or permanently, bunkered. We'll see. Maybe the monument will "sprout", who knows. It will be evaluated worse. But it is certain that he will be the target of vandals. And that we will once again ask who exactly is bothering the murdered prime minister and who is behind the act of vandalism. And the answer is perhaps simple and universal: Serbia stands, the one he fought against. And which, it seems, is not only impossible to defeat, but also impossible to leave you alone to rest.
