"Vremena" interlocutor, political consultant Dušan Lj. Milenković, even in the middle of last year, claimed that it was difficult to imagine that political crisis in Serbia can reconcile without leaving the regime Aleksandar Vučić into a political mess. He believes that the survival of the government only deepens the crisis, just as he is convinced that the majority of Serbia is against this regime.
"According to all public opinion surveys, students have already made a key change in public opinion with their activism: the majority of citizens are against the regime. Mass protests are now no longer as important as some other forms of political activism, such as messages, alliances, organizations, etc.," says Milenkovic in an interview with "Vreme".
"WEATHER" In public they are, among opponents of the regime, dominant two attitudes: some claim that the government has consolidated after many months of protests and give rather dark forecasts, while others say that in fact the regime is unstoppably bursting at the seams before our eyes. Which opinion is closer to you??
DUŠAN LJ. MILENKOVIĆ: I think the mode is "bursting at the seams". This difference you mention is not due to ignorance of the facts on one side or the other, but differences in character and expectations, as well as different definitions of consolidation. Characteristically, it is the difference between pessimists and optimists, in expectations - it is the difference between excessive and measured projections. In terms of definitions, these two groups differ in that one defines consolidation by the amount of evil that this regime does, while the others (of which I belong) mean by consolidation the regime's ability to predictably manage society and events. So I accept the argument of the former that in the last nine months the regime has moved into the phase of unlimited crimes (and criminals), but I do not consider this as consolidation, because this is precisely an indication that they have lost all other capabilities. Their monopoly of power - not only state but also criminal, financial and media - has never been contested, nor has it been questioned at any time. The difference is that they have now abolished all restrictions on the use of the monopoly of force, i.e. restrictions on crimes against the citizens of Serbia.
Goal, what do you call it, "monopoly of force" is to intimidate citizens and politically demobilize them. Can a show of force have the effect the regime is counting on?? Or the regime was late in this?
There is always the option to keep the regime in power by violence, that is, to grow from an autocracy into a complete dictatorship and even into fascism. I cannot estimate what we are closer to, but the key determinant of further development is the resistance of the majority of Serbia. I do not mean only the resistance in the streets, but the collective effort and motivation to return democracy to Serbia.
To what extent is the shift of the so-called. loyalist so-called. super loyalists (and other turbulences in the police, judiciary and elsewhere) a sign that the regime is weak? Or maybe it's strong.? What is the meaning of those rattling changes?
This is precisely an excellent indicator of the regime's crisis. Their paranoia, that is. fear of betrayal and loss of power, has reached an almost mythical level. They resemble King Eris II from Game of Thrones, who in moments of agony from the impending defeat cried out: "Burn them all!" That is how the ruling regime in Serbia goes in order and honors all those who did not show the highest possible level of loyalty and willingness to sacrifice in order for the government to survive. I understand why they do it, but I don't see the point, because those people, members of the system who were never progressives but kept quiet and did not bother in their institutions far from the public eye - were the backbone of the government. I don't consider them loyalists - they are hundreds and hundreds, maybe even thousands of people, who are somehow punished for "insufficient gratitude" for receiving a salary from the budget of the Republic of Serbia. In the last nine months, the regime has been producing its enemies faster than at any time in the last 14 years.
photo: marija janković...
I just wanted to ask you about the productive regime stamping of the enemy. In order to, in your opinion, the anti-regime public should have reacted to those who were under attack by the regime, and until recently they were his collaborators?
All those people whom the regime is now turning into its enemies should be accepted as important witnesses and interlocutors, especially those who are ready to speak at this moment. Yes, these are the people thanks to whose inaction and silence this regime has survived for so long, but they may also be the people thanks to whose actions and talk this regime can fall. That's not a bad trade for the anti-regime front.
And should some of them be included in the anti-regime front, or is more lost than gained?? I remind you that Nebojša Čović was also in DOS, Momcilo Perišić, Vuk Obradović and others who were important associates of Milošević.
Everything that happened during Milosevic's time, what DOS was like and who were the personalities you list - is completely irrelevant to today's context. Completely irrelevant. This is a different era, a different autocracy, that is, incomparably more totalitarian. He holds in his hands most of the institutions, complete power both horizontally (executive, legislative, judicial) and vertically (republican, provincial and city/municipal level), crime, 90 percent of the media... And all the billionaires are theirs. Now that we've separated that, let's also clarify that about admission to the anti-regime front. Not as members of the front, but as supporters yes. In my opinion, it should be accepted that they actively support the struggle to change the regime.
There is a current problem with the media. Soon it can be expected that Serbia will be left without some of the most influential and still few, critical media. To what extent will it affect the political situation??
If the regime shuts down or silences critical media within the United Group, it would mean that the anti-regime public loses its most important channel of information and it would be necessary to look for alternative channels of daily information. The problem with this approach is that not all people will invest the time and attention to find alternative sources. They are likely to be left with a choice: either regime propaganda or not informing. Social networks will, of course, always remain an option, and online information will soon overtake television in Serbia as well. But online information is still inferior in terms of the quality of production and the resources that United Group has, in order to cover all political events in Serbia in a timely and high-quality manner. To conclude - along with hacker attacks on portals and profiles on social networks, this move represents the regime's biggest trump card in the fight to stay in power. I do not count here the conflict in the anti-regime front as an asset of the regime, although it may be a decisive factor. I think that the possibilities of the regime are much less than people attribute to them, that is, that the responsibility is on the anti-regime side.
However, it seems that the conflicts on the anti-regime front started a long time ago, I'm primarily referring to fights on the party line-students. Does it exist, in your opinion, there is still a chance that these "misunderstandings" put on hold. That is, What do you think is the best outcome for the anti-Vuvučić forces??
These are not conflicts, but disagreements. The most important thing is that this does not happen before the elections and that there is an agreement on coordination and non-aggression. I believe that it is possible, of course, especially when the student list is published. As for the performance in the elections, research shows that it is most important that there are no more than three opposition columns, ie the student list, the pro-European opposition and the anti-EU opposition. Anything above that creates serious risks, anything below that maintains a high chance of winning.
Although they are still alive, protests are no longer as numerous as they used to be. Is it a sign of weakness on the other side or actually a signal that the fight against the regime has entered a new phase?
It is a natural sequence of events. Since the students demanded early parliamentary elections, their focus has shifted to preparing the list and electoral mechanisms. Also, the citizens who support them accommodated their expectations, reduced them to the overthrow of the regime in the elections. Since election day has become the goal, people no longer have as much reason to be on the streets as they did before May 2025. They are looking for elections and a new government that will fulfill the demands of the students and change the country for the better. According to all public opinion surveys, the students' activism has already made a key change in public opinion because the majority of citizens are against the regime. Mass protests are now no longer as important as some other forms of political activism, such as messaging, alliances, organizing, etc.
There are several possible scenarios before us. First of all, we do not know whether the parliamentary elections will be called by the New Year. Another, it is not clear whether parliamentary and presidential elections will be announced simultaneously. In any case, which scenario would be the best for the anti-Vučić forces, and what sequence of events does not go their way?
The best scenario for the anti-Vučić forces is to call only extraordinary parliamentary elections, before the presidential elections in 2027. That way, these forces will have a clear path to changing the address of power in this society, even though Vučić would remain in the position of president. The second best scenario would be for the parliamentary elections to come after the presidential elections in 2027, because in those conditions it would be much easier to run next to a candidate not named Vučić, and symbolically it could be a serious blow to the regime. The most difficult scenario for the anti-Vučić forces would be the merging of the presidential and parliamentary elections, whether it happens this year or next year, and I believe that this is exactly what will happen.
The regime forces seem to have a problem with the presidential candidate. What personality profile will the government play on, and which personality profile would be suitable for the anti-Vučić block?
The government's problem is that in 14 years they failed to build a single political figure, except for Aleksandar Vučić. Maybe it was intentional, but because of that they are now in a situation where they are once again thinking about "external" candidates. If the largest party in Serbia does not have an obvious candidate one year before the presidential elections, it means that the party has no political value. They have been reaching out to non-party people (Mayors of Belgrade, prime ministers, ministers) for years. It is nothing new, but it is devastating for them as a party. On the other hand, it seems to me that the anti-regime front does not have a problem with candidates, because with the emergence of the student movement, we got an actor who has the credibility to persuade the biggest Serbian names to get involved in politics. It opens up a sea of possibilities and creates a key advantage.
At the end, In your opinion, has the perception of Vučić's regime definitely changed in the West and to what extent can this affect political changes in Serbia??
Everything indicates that it is so. I have information from various addresses in the West, but of course it is far from a relevant sample for me to say that with certainty. By combining this information with the behavior of Western actors, we get the picture that, for the first time, he stands badly in three of the four key areas of Serbian foreign policy. That is, only in China there is still a good partner. The third is Russia, of course. The impact of his bad position in the West is that it opens the possibility for domestic actors who aspire to win power in Serbia - to have interlocutors even before they win that power. It is up to them whether they will take advantage of that opportunity.
