We can accuse the Vučić regime of all possible wrongdoings: we will hardly be wrong anywhere. And those who vote for progressives from different interests, do not live at the bottom of the ocean, know how malignant the character of this government is, with whose destructive actions many generations will struggle. However, if we are not conspiracy theorists, we can hardly point to Vučić as someone who is directly responsible for the recent collapse of the opposition, that is, the collapse of the "Serbia against violence" coalition. They fell on their own, they killed themselves, he only helped!
But it's the stupidest thing to whine now - we need to find out how the crash happened, learn lessons and see how to make the damage as small as possible.
The opposition, thanks to its own efforts, found itself in front of the Tanmanvilaje election. Both directions were wrong and dangerous. Elem could decide to boycott the local elections or participate in them. Those who claim that participation in the electoral process to some extent legitimizes mindless and proven progressive frauds are right. But, quite logically, the question of what the boycott brings was also raised. In order to be successful, it had to be strategically designed, comprehensive, created in such a way as to animate as many citizens as possible for extra-institutional struggle. Otherwise, it would really seem like - not a very clearly motivated surrender in the announcement! Especially after the bad experience with the 2020 boycott. The strategy obviously did not exist, and it is difficult to imagine tens of thousands of citizens on the streets, again, at least in a confused and vague context. Even if they came out - would it have a decisive effect?
The success of the boycott also depends on the support of the West, and Western diplomats have repeatedly emphasized that the boycott is not an adequate way of fighting. In addition, it is unlikely that the West would get too excited even if all local elections were boycotted, and especially if the opposition decided - which seems realistic and if unity is maintained - to ignore only the Belgrade ones. At the same time, opposition deputies sit in the republican and provincial assemblies, and councilors in numerous local assemblies. Doesn't it all seem silly? Just as silly is the fact that the anti-Western coalition Nada was counting on Western pressure.
Therefore, perhaps the boycott would have stronger consequences if the opposition withdrew from all parliaments. But then she would find herself in the situation she was in after the 2020 elections. Many opposition parties barely survived the boycott, they were put on a begging stick. Enthusiasm is important in politics, but it is infantile to think that politics can be conducted without money, especially if you have against you an authoritarian and kleptocratic regime that has privatized everything that can be privatized in the state. In addition, the decision on a general boycott would lead, once again, to serious divisions in the opposition, in terms of width and depth.
COMPLICATED COMMUNICATION - DEATH TO POLITICS
Both options would mean very difficult and complicated communication with citizens, which is death for politics. Especially after the idea of a boycott was launched into the public, with accompanying slogans. How, for example, would you explain to someone from Novi Sad, who thinks that the opposition has a real chance to beat the progressives in the capital of Vojvodina, even in such bad election conditions, that he should stay at home on election day? How would one explain, on the other hand, that it is necessary to boycott only the Belgrade elections, when electoral irregularities exist everywhere?
In the case of going to the polls, again the question: how to explain to the citizens that it is important to participate in elections that were stolen in advance? The story about the theft of the election, which is of course important, covered all other political topics in the independent and opposition media, which ultimately benefited the Vučić regime. The regime made no secret of its intention to continue with the same practice in order to discourage citizens and break society. The goal is for opponents of the regime to come to terms with fate, to make sure that changes are not possible here. The model we have seen in many countries in which there is a so-called multiparty system.
It was illusory to expect that the regime would agree to more seriously change the election conditions, even if it miraculously decided to move all elections to the fall. There would only be some cosmetics. In fact, in the case of postponing the elections, the confusion would only be prolonged, and the results of the traumatic process, which would exhaust both citizens and political actors, would most likely be the same. It should also be borne in mind that the EU and the USA are in election processes this year, not to mention the global political situation. Something does not seem that they will excessively deal with local elections in the unfortunate Balkan state.
WORST SCENARIO
Choosing between two bad options, the opposition managed to choose the third, the worst: to quarrel and divide among themselves. The paradox is all the greater because the subject of the dispute was, as things stand, only the Belgrade elections. Boycott-parties will also go to the other local Kandas, leaving the decision on that to the local committees. Or local committees will participate in them regardless of the opinion of the headquarters.
The damage will be much greater if boycott parties and "fighting" parties continue to settle accounts with each other, fiercely dividing the opposition electorate. Especially if they accuse each other of collaborating with the regime, which would be both ugly and disastrous. Although the division is serious, it should not be an obstacle for some future cooperation, or even coalitions at the local on June 2.
The story of the boycott went public prematurely and recklessly. Politically, she was infantile, although it is clear that she had the best intentions behind her. It immediately led to different views and divisions and was a time bomb just waiting for the moment to go off.
In Novi Sad, for example, the opposition had a serious chance to threaten the local progressive government, which systematically destroyed the city. Regardless of whether it would come out in one, two or three columns. The results of the previous elections show this, as well as public opinion surveys. But what was happening in Belgrade threatened the opportunity. The chance, as we said, is reduced even if all parties have given up any boycott. Because of the confusion, the opposition's standby regime and sloganeering boycott-rhetoric. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that in this one and a half month campaign, the opposition parties and groups of citizens in this city will succeed in animating dissatisfied citizens, especially since in previous years they were very active in criticizing the city government and discovered numerous scandals. In these elections, the government will certainly activate some groups of citizens and support the parties with whom they have been cooperating for a long time and successfully, but it seems - at least according to the results of the previous elections - that there has been a certain political maturation of the people of Novi Sad and that they will not fall for these tricks to a large extent. By the way, in Novi Sad, all "Serbia against violence" parties participate in the elections, as things stand now.
We cite Novi Sad as a significant example.
WHY WE ARE WHERE WE ARE
Now, why did the worst case scenario happen and are there any lessons to be learned from all this? The coalition "Serbia against violence" is a great opposition success in the fight against the undemocratic and kleptocratic regime, there is no doubt about that. However, the fact is that it functioned with many internal contradictions, and that enormous energy was spent on mutual supremacy and positioning. Sometimes she was staring too much at her own navel, it seemed that she was neither in heaven nor on earth. Obviously, there was a lack of a leader like Zoran Djindjic, who could unite all contradictions and interests, having a clear vision. Perhaps in this respect, some kind of reset of the opposition scene can have positive effects.
The problem was that there was no clear procedure within the coalition as to how certain decisions were made, as well as the fact that some parties too often felt marginalized and thwarted. In life and politics, it is always stupid to threaten with an empty gun. What did it look like in this case? The opposition tells the authorities: if you don't change the election conditions, we won't go to the elections. And they ask: which elections will you not participate in? Wait until we ask the local boards. It seems that we will not only go to the Belgrade ones.
Looking at it now, it seems that it was wisest not to mention the boycott unless absolutely necessary. That the tension was maintained, that the citizens were encouraged that the progressive regime can be defeated even in unequal conditions, because there will certainly never be equals under Vučić. Participation in elections, without months of confusion, would certainly simplify communication with citizens. And it would be easier to detect and document the expected electoral malpractices, and maybe even exit the electoral process with great fanfare on election day if the big fraudsters are discovered. In parallel with that, do everything else that was otherwise called the agenda of the opposition: to act institutionally, extra-institutionally, to animate Western decision-makers, as well as the public of democratic states.
PAJTIC - EXTENDED DURATION OF THE PARTY IN POWER
We discuss all this with the former president of the DS, Bojan Pajtić, and political scientist Milorad Đurić, who have somewhat conflicting opinions on the boycott, although both agree that division within the opposition is the worst possible scenario.
Pajtić reminds that "Serbia against violence" received almost a million votes in the December elections, about 24 percent of support. That, in the conditions of media blockade, vote buying and voter migration from neighboring countries to Serbia, is an extraordinary success, he says.
"Representatives of the parties that made it up showed a high level of maturity and responsibility by already having an agreement on a single exit, as well as on the schedule and number of mandates intended for individual parties, on the day of the announcement of the election - without prior media exaggeration and fighting. This, along with the successful Proclamation campaign, stimulated a large number of opposition voters to go to the polls. Such a large bloc instilled hope in progressive citizens, enabled a more successful political struggle against a violent regime, caused quite a bit of panic in the ranks of the ruling party and earned the respect of the international community. Only such a large group, which in total has more than 20 percent of support, can stand on the government's line in terms of logistics, security, and election control. It remains a great regret that, in part, that group rejected the influence and power of engaging a huge number of people in a short period of time. "It seems that the opposition has replaced the role of a kind of counterpart to the regime with the role of Don Quixote," says Pajtić.
He reminds that the evidence of voter theft and migration was so massive and convincing that neither the international community nor the regime could, as so many times before, ignore them. In his opinion, the opposition bloc (which includes "Serbia against violence" and Nada) had to remain united and persistent in insisting on better election conditions and holding elections in the fall - at the cost of a boycott.
"The regime, which is experiencing defeats everywhere - from the Council of Europe to the UN Assembly, could not bear the new international turmoil and new internal tensions. They would have to postpone the elections and improve the conditions under the pressure of the mentioned two opposition coalitions. This way, the worst option remains for this country - there are no serious concessions, and the opposition is divided. "It seems that the term of the party in power has been extended in a way that even they did not expect, and certainly did not deserve", says Pajtić.
ĐURIĆ - IN THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF SERBIA, THERE WAS NO FUNCTIONAL ELECTION BOYCOTT
Political scientist Milorad Đurić says that the separation of the strongest opposition bloc, which only a few months ago achieved very significant results, has no justification whatsoever. According to him, the unity of the opposition parties gathered in the "Serbia against violence" coalition was an imperative of this political moment.
"I am afraid that a good political momentum has been lost and that the opposition has taken a step back. At this moment, we can only speculate about the essential reasons for this divergence. However, two things are obvious - the first is the surprising absence of clear procedures for making the most important decisions within the coalition (whether it is decided by majority vote or by consensus) and the second, the mention of a 'change of generations', which could be a euphemism for a deeper change in relations between the opposition parties. How much all this will really affect the future political environment will be shown, of course, by the elections themselves. The parties that will participate in the elections have a serious task to mobilize adequate political energy in these new circumstances in order to nullify the negative effects of the current opposition fragmentation. In that process, a minimum of political responsibility (and seriousness) will mean that, during the campaign, the parties participating in the elections and those who have opted for the boycott will absolutely refrain from attacking, accusing and labeling each other," he says.
Đurić also believes that a functional boycott would only be possible if it included all non-regime political actors, at all levels. This has never happened in the short political history of Serbia since the restoration of multi-party system until today, he reminds.
"Nor is it likely to happen in the foreseeable future. All previous attempts were fragmentary and, as a rule, resulted in a decrease in the political resources of the boycott implementers. Bearing all this in mind, it is particularly difficult to understand the logic that implies participation in the work of the republican parliament, leaves the decision on participation in all other local elections to the municipal committees, and at the same time insists on boycotting only the Belgrade elections. This undoubtedly only produces additional confusion and frustration, both among members of the opposition parties and among citizens," says Đurić.
