Ljubomir Madzar...
Delays in the formation of a new government after the elections have become a standard practice in our country. Empirically oriented workers in the field of political science will probably investigate this phenomenon in a comparative way, but there should be no doubt that in the length of the formation of the mentioned new governments, we will turn out to be striking record holders. No one like us - carrying out tasks that have an obvious importance for the efficient functioning of the economy and society is - it seems - our specialty.
Behind every phenomenon, especially one that is strikingly deviant and unusual, there is someone else interest. In our country, it is not difficult to determine whose interest it could be. In this country, the President of the Republic (PR) decides on everything that is of certain importance, as well as an unfathomably large number of things that are not really important, certainly represents the address to which the question of deciding on the time of the formation of the government should be asked. Therefore, the issue of interest that determines the appropriate, in this case extremely atypical, decisions goes to the same address. We have to wait so long for the formation of governments simply because he decided so; if he wanted to, he could have decided much differently and governments would not have been formed after the results of the elections were almost forgotten.
PERSONAL INTEREST OF THE HEAD OF STATE
What and how is the PR's interest in that extremely long wait for the formation of the government formed and how is social interest affected by that delay? As for the interest of PR, it is not easy to identify it a priori and purely logically. This could best be established by a journalist-investigator, provided that he finds the courage to ask the appropriate questions and that he finds the PR in a good mood, that, as grumpy as he can be sometimes, he does not scold him at the top of his lungs and accuse him of an attack on his reputation
However, something can be concluded a priori, even if only as probable. The first and most important conclusion is that it makes it so much more difficult to form a government because he as an individual he has an interest in such a thing. Gone are the days when there were theories in circulation according to which the holders of power and the possessors of power give everything for the common cause and sacrifice themselves selflessly for the good of the people without, on the other hand, expecting anything for themselves or doing anything for their own benefit. Today, the predominant paradigm according to which behind every action, even giving up an act, is a very specific, ultimately individualized interest. There is only a narrow segment of the area of interest where the two interests somewhat coincide, when an individual, achieving visible social benefits, gains reputation and hopes that he will be recorded in history for good, and thus achieves a certain individual benefit thanks to the fact that he did something useful and for society. The conclusion is self-evident: the formation of governments is delayed so much because there is a subject that benefits from it. Attribute considerable it follows from the fact that the formation of the government is a matter of great general interest and that some particular interest, insignificant for society but very important for the individual, could not determine manipulations with that important act. We may not be able to accurately identify the interest that determines this unusual phenomenon, and yet, without falling into any logical difficulties, assert that the person who decides on this important matter is in any case personally and interested.
However, some additional components of personal interest can be sensed, at least tentatively. Our PR is a very busy man. He gets involved in so many decisions, mostly outside his constitutional and legal jurisdiction. It would not be surprising if he somehow turns out to be the busiest head of state in the world. In that terrifying multitude of jobs, he can, under great pressure, shift his priorities and postpone even very important things, dealing with other issues, longer than he should. A larger conclusion follows from this: PR should significantly reduce its engagement and reduce the amount of work it performs. Thus, it would greatly reduce the mass of constitutional transgressions and legal violations, since the officials are allowed only what is expressly assigned to them by the regulations and what the legal norms oblige them to do; and (2) in a significantly reduced mass of engagements and jobs, he would better recognize priorities, and he would not even get involved in a good number of major matters because those in the form of responsibilities and obligations were not assigned to him by the constitution and law.
The third component of his interest is a kind of rigorous training of officials who will eventually enter the government and be nominated for various state agencies. The more he delays their appointment, the more their nerves are strained, and perhaps the greater will be their gratitude for the award of high titles. It would also be a specific way to encourage them to work better, because it is very necessary considering the logic of the election by which these good officials are appointed to responsible positions. That logic is well-known: loyalty and obedience come first, and ability and professional training are far lower on the scale of appointment requirements. The delay in the formation of the government and the filling of various agencies could also be a way of increasing the prestige and power of PR because politicians like to be appreciated and loved. This postponement of the formation of the government could also be a means of encouraging the competition of suitable contenders: there is no doubt that the competition is all the greater if the period of definitive decision is longer, and in this case the competition also lowers the price - PR tries, and in this case succeeds, to make its future associates as cheaply as possible. Part of this price is certainly loyalty in future cooperation, flexibility in relation to future orders and, simply put, condescension. Price reduction in this relationship, which is far from market and is not achieved through market transactions, ultimately boils down to the fact that for less he gets from the other more.
WHAT ABOUT SOCIAL INTEREST
As far as social interest is concerned, it can be briefly and easily concluded that with this delay in forming the government, it can only be reduced. This directly follows from the elementary fact that in the general case, individual and general interest do not coincide, and that here a large number of circumstances have been identified that emphatically work in favor of personal interest. If there are strong forces that pull towards personal interest, then that interest will have to be decisive, and the conclusion about the destruction of the social interest immediately follows. Because PR has confirmed itself as a rational player, and such a player has only one, certainly unique, goal function, which excludes the maximization of any other goal function, even if it is entirely derived from some broader social interest.
Postponing the formation of the government is, therefore, a consequence of strictly individual interest at the expense of the public good and general betterment. During the long period of waiting for a new government, the country must enter a technical government regime, in which capacity the old government acts until a new one is formed. A technical government is less efficient than a regular one. Its reach, and especially its pretensions, are inevitably reduced by the very logic of its time-limited status, many decisions are postponed due to the legitimized belief that it is not the time for the technical government to interfere in the making of more serious decisions. Business entities in that transitional period limit their activity, not knowing in which elements the new government will change the current policy and, on that basis, expecting information about the changes to which they will have to adapt. Both the predictably narrowed scope of the technical government and the slowing down of the rhythm of business activities in anticipation of changes in politics are an obvious setback and stagnation in the economy and represent a large component of the general costs of the hesitation in the obviously necessary formation of the government and the final transition to a normal mode of functioning of both the state and the economy.
It was mentioned that major decisions are especially postponed. This, however, means that it is not only about reducing the total mass of decisions, which in itself is unfavorable, but also about changing the structure of government decision-making. Management capacity and related energy is spent on less important and from a social point of view less useful items, and potentially significant effects that could be achieved by making larger decisions remain unused. Social loss, therefore, occurs on the basis of a kind of deformation in the decision-making structure and the diversion of management activities to less priority items in the repertoire of public policy.
The last component of the sweeping cost of this extravagant political behavior of our head of state is a new and separate incentive for the spread of corruption. For years, Serbia has been shown to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world on relevant international lists. In such a country, quite small, simply benign reasons can lead to significant jumps in corruption. And this meaningful delay in forming a new government after the elections gives corruption quite recognizable reasons and incentives. Almost without exception, ministers in the current government want to win the same or similar portfolios in the future government. However, many can hope for that, but no one can be sure of their analogous involvement in the future government. It is undoubtedly an occasion for influence-sharing and the provision of state-organized favors to some powerful people in exchange for helping to secure a good position after the new government is formed and the minister discovers that he did not get the right position in it. Another factor that acts in terms of encouraging corruption is the belief that for the outgoing minister, the probability of discovering corrupt acts is significantly reduced. With such a large scale of total corruption, this special incentive for its spread cannot be written off as insignificant. The unfavorable consequences of too long an interval between governments formed after and as a result of successive elections, both the consequences analyzed here and those not mentioned here, are numerous and large enough that the systematic delay in the formation of post-election governments must be characterized as a serious political and social problem. Due to this problem, there is a serious need to finally remove it from our political landscape.
POLITICAL LACK OF PATRIOTIC FEELINGS
The excessively long functioning of technical governments after the elections can be briefly qualified as a major social nuisance in the bottom line because it imposes large costs on society. These costs are primarily material and financial, but they also include regularly caused disturbances in other spheres of social life - disturbances that do not have their financial equivalent but generate costs in a broader sense. One can talk about the general costs that arise as a result of arbitrary decision-making at one easily identifiable point in our political system. At that point, the conflict between individual and general social interest is sharply outlined. There is no doubt that it provides recognizable individual benefits (benefits!) but the accompanying social damages and losses are far greater. Politicians with a striking lack of patriotic feeling are most easily recognized by the fact that they are ready to slaughter a social ox for a pound of their own meat.
The author is a retired economist and professor
