It should not have been clairvoyant to know that when the Serbian Progressive Party came to power, the citizens of Serbia would lose the right to replace the government, which was one of the not-so-countless achievements - along with certain electoral problems that normally adorn transition countries without a democratic tradition - of the October 5th political changes . It was only necessary to know the character of "unsuccessfully treated radicals", that is, to understand that they perceive both politics and life as a war in which they must win at all costs - stepping over the dead was never a problem for them. What kind of Geneva Conventions, what kind of democratic procedures, what kind of independent institutions, what responsibility, truth and other coppers!
In order to make sure of that, we didn't even have to wait for the next elections in the organization of the new government. Already in the process of the so-called alignment of local authorities with the state, in 2012, a good part of the arsenal of progressive cruelty and arrogance was seen, which would eventually take the form of an organized criminal enterprise: from buying, blackmail, threats, use of force, to the arrest of political opponents. With the aim of establishing power in the local self-governments according to the new rulers of Serbia, and above all, leveling the opposition with the ground.
The mechanism was also noticeable in the extraordinary elections in some local governments, held in 2013. Neither society nor international organizations considered these events relevant for a reaction, so in a way they participated in the beginning of the birth of a shoreless political monster that ate the state like a banana. Few understood that the destruction of the opposition and the political alternative is not only the problem of Vučić's political opponents, but everyone's problem. We are not going to talk about the "white tickets", which in the name of the highest democratic principles contributed to the abolition and destruction of democracy, nor about individual civic parties that sold themselves for a pan of baklava, and it cannot be said that they did not know where things were going.
It is difficult, even from the most realistic position, to talk about any great successes of the Vučić regime in the past decade and a half, and for the benefit of the citizens. Both the economic and infrastructural achievements, so advertised, are based on enormous borrowing and the growth of social inequalities, i.e. abnormal corruption. The overall global economic rise after the global crisis was also in favor of the regime. On the other hand, the government was very effective when it comes to enslaving institutions and the media, and destroying society. Politics was practically abolished: it moved to the pages of black chronicles and variety shows. However, the greatest "success" of the progressives is the improvement of election management, which is synonymous with irregularities, slander, fraud and theft. Seen from this position, it seems that the frequent election cycles served (i) to train the progressive voting machinery, which is now so capacitated that it practically cannot lose elections. A row of corrupt, a row of blackmailed, a row of servants, a row of "phantom" and a row of "dead" souls with the right to vote, ten thousand there, ten thousand here.
In the meantime, generations of progressive activists have grown up who perceive political confusion as the most normal job in the world. It would be interesting to find out how many people in this country do not deal with anything else, that is, how many of them live and feed their families out of this nonsense.
HOW TO FIGHT WITH THE DIAGNOSIS?
The diagnosis has long been established both here and among those who are concerned outside, what is some kind of success of both the opposition and the critical part of the public. But the question is not a million, but a billion dollars - how to fight against an incomparably more powerful opponent, who has money like money, well-paid media, force, a helpful and obedient judiciary, and the evident support of the most important international factors? The latter is thinning, but we are far from developed countries worrying too much about the state of democracy on these meridians. Maybe they have some other plans that have been measured for decades, maybe they don't, but it's stupid to blame only them for what we live in - to a good extent, we have formatted ourselves according to Vučić's measures. Global opportunities certainly go hand in hand for Serbia. After a period of dreaming about democracy and human rights, today we live in a world stripped of power and interests. You don't even need to provide evidence for that.
Well, now goes the story of the glass half full and half empty. The opposition in Serbia started showing the first signs of life only sometime in 2016 and 2017. When you look at where she started and how far she has come - it's not like she doesn't have any results. Although it was born with difficulty, with difficulty, with struggles, mutual arrogance and literary leadership vanity, today Serbia still has a relevant, mostly united opposition of the civil spectrum. Isn't this expensive...
Although much more was expected, the achieved results of the opposition in the December elections are not so bad either. Looking more broadly, at the entire critical public, it should also be said that many non-governmental organizations have matured and become relevant controllers of the government and its abuses, i.e. they have emerged from the senseless and fruitless procession of the institutional development of the state through cooperation with the regime that destroys institutions as much as last year's snow. The once ubiquitous idea that political changes can be achieved without political parties has also been abandoned. The December elections, as well as the events that preceded them, show that one of the preconditions for the change of any authoritarian regime has been created - and that is the cooperation of the opposition, non-governmental organizations, civil movements, public figures and the so-called. ordinary citizens.
WHAT IS EVEN DIFFERENT?
The elections held on December 17 differ in some respects compared to some previous progressive elections. The opposition and the civil sector have demonstrated the ability to present, specify and quantify evidence of numerous electoral frauds. To that should be added never before extensive and relevant and horribly devastating analyzes and monitoring of the media scene, which show even the most ignorant in letters and numbers that the media in Serbia are instrumentalized according to the (Belarusian) principle, and that - thanks to this - the elections are irregular and before they are announced. Expert organizations are responsible for these analyses. Not only did prominent public figures become active, not caring about the fact that they would be accused of political-party involvement from various sides, but also some important social groups, such as students, took an important part in the (post)election process.
The opposition and the civil sector have shown that they have the power to gather a large, although perhaps not decisively large number of people in street protests, without hiding behind "unknown organizers". And on those in May and June, and on those after the election theft. The reports and statements of some international observers and officials, as well as the official position of certain powerful countries, such as Germany, are more eloquent and critical than ever before. Although still not nearly as fierce as the local democratic public expects, considering the "situation on the ground". However, until recently, it was hard to even imagine that some European official would say what the head of the European Parliament's observation mission, Klemen Grošelj, said the other day: that due to election tricks, the EU's doors to Serbia will soon be closed!
However, all of the above does not mean that Vučić's government will give in under pressure and that it will agree to repeat the elections or to organize an international investigation of election irregularities. Realistically, it will be difficult for them to be convinced by potential very massive protests, nor numerous evidence of electoral fraud, nor hunger strikes, nor international pressure, especially if they are at the current level. That is, it is still a big unknown what needs to be done to achieve at least some symbolic victory against an incomparably stronger and shamelessly arrogant opponent. Of course, "experts" on social networks and various "analysts" have an answer to this question, as well as to all the doubts of this world, but they are mostly infantile ramblings full of passion. It seems that there is no simple answer.
The next protests are scheduled for January 16, the opposition announced. They will also mark the anniversary of the liquidation of the Kosovo politician Oliver Ivanovic, which is certainly - in the fierce competition - the biggest, if you can call it that, progressive affair. But what if a relatively small number of people show up at these protests due to bad weather or post-election depression? And what if there are tens of thousands of citizens on the streets? It wouldn't be the first time.
One thing is certain: the opposition and the citizens-"destroyers" of the autocratic regime have a long, very hard road ahead of them, they will need a lot of patience and effort. It's a common place, but that's how it is.
THREE TRACKS OF STRUGGLE
The opposition announces that it will continue the fight on three tracks. Two imply the so-called internal pressure. First of all, civil protests that will lead to the unification of all democratic forces in the country. Then there is institutional pressure, that is, the use of all legal means in order to expose, debunk and sanction numerous, concrete and documented cases of electoral irregularities. The third track is international: that is, encouraging important Western factors to strongly pressure Vučić's regime, in order to democratize and humanize it. But also how the international arbitration of the election process would take place, which would lead to the annulment of the December elections, that is, the organization of new elections under different conditions. Vučić has already answered that the latter does not occur to him.
There is no doubt that when it comes to protests, the government will play the attrition card. So far, she has been successful in that. You ignore it and it goes away on its own. Over time, all anti-Vuvučić protests lost their strength and remained without concrete results. No matter how much anger grows, citizens become disincentivized. However, it cannot be said that the post-election protests, including hunger strikes, were completely without any effect, and not only because of the international resonance. It may turn out to be not a bad opposition capital for the next, regular local elections, which will be held at the end of spring.
In addition to exploitation, the government will also use other methods to undermine possibly very massive civil protests, and that is certainly the introduction of activists who will give the demonstrations a violent character. Seen so many times. The government has been preparing "its public" for a long time that it will use severe force if the protests turn violent, with statements that the "hateful" West is behind the distressed citizens and wants to create a new Maidan in Serbia. Prime Minister Brnabić said that the authorities found out about it from the Russian secret services, and she thanked them for that. At the same time, Russian Ambassador Bochan-Kharchenko said that he was personally informed about the brokering of Western agents by Aleksandar Vučić. Generally, it is difficult to distinguish who is informing whom. Reactions to these statements from the West were, expectedly or unexpectedly, mild.
There are also the good old methods of spin, diverting attention from the crisis with, say, silly stories about the introduction of mandatory military service. There is also Kosovo, as well as the president's endless appearances on national frequencies, which aim to send a mythomaniac message that he is the only one who knows the right path, sent from above to the Serbs, a victim in which everyone digs, from the West to the opposition, and even the people around him.
The opposition is aware that there is nothing to solve the problem by institutional means. They will complain to the institutions that, at the very least, participated in the organized criminal enterprise through their inaction. Including the Constitutional Court of Serbia, which floats somewhere in orbit and spends money for nothing.
As for the international factor, it is difficult to expect significant developments, that is, that the government will be strongly pressured to repeat the elections and admit election irregularities. In the best case, it may happen that the elections in Belgrade will be called in the spring, with another local one, but under the pretext that it was not possible to form a stable majority in the city parliament. As a kind of compromise. Of course, the authorities will not be shaken by threats to stop European integration, because they have never been interested in that. But, due to his kleptomaniac character, he wouldn't want to be left without European money.
The letters that opposition officials send to international entities have a somewhat desperate aura. It is not excluded that the final report of the ODIHR observation mission, which is expected at the end of February, will be significantly more "washed down", that is, less critical than the preliminary one, which contained harsh assessments of election irregularities. This is supported by the letter that the director of ODIHR Mateo Maccachi sent to Ana Brnabić. He thanked for the "excellent cooperation between ODIHR and the Government of Serbia", as well as for "providing the necessary funds for the work of the Mission".
When it comes to the international factor and the possible participation of the European Parliament in the investigation of electoral irregularities, there are two important problems even if this institution is interested in doing so. First, it can only happen if Vučić approves, and secondly, the European Parliament is dissolved in a month, the elections will be held in June, and only then will the process of forming various working bodies begin. Although the European institutions will work, it is clear that other things will take priority.
Some analysts say that perhaps the case of North Macedonia could be applied in Serbia. Members of the European Parliament played an important role in organizing fair and democratic elections in this country, and then in overthrowing the authoritarian VMRO-DPMNE government. However, in relation to the former Macedonian regime, Vučić has more trump cards in his hands: first of all, there is Kosovo, with which he has been trading skillfully for so long. And then there is Russian influence and power to produce regional instability to the best of its ability.
"PUT PROTESTS ON THE SECOND PLAN"
Political analyst Dejan Bursać believes that the opposition should put the story of protests and irregularities in the December elections on the back burner, and focus much more on the upcoming local elections. He says that the opposition's post-election activities were insufficiently competently organized, that things moved according to inertia and that the moves were not sufficiently thought out. He believes that the positions of the opposition were imposed by external actors, such as activists on social networks and some analysts.
"The opposition has a significant chance to triumph in some cities and municipalities, and it should focus its energy on that. It shows that, especially in big cities, the difference between SNS and the united opposition is reduced to only a few percent. In the meantime, through work, this relationship can be further changed in favor of the opposition. The opposition should make a strategic assessment in which of the hundreds of cities and municipalities where the elections will be held, it has the greatest chance of winning and direct its organizational, media and other capacities towards them. Especially taking into account the fact that they have mastered the lesson on electoral irregularities, that they know the progressive electoral 'modus operandi' and that they can come up with a way to effectively fight against it, mobilizing the citizens for that fight", says Bursać.
WHETHER TO ACCEPT MANDATES?
Among the public, but also among some opposition politicians, the question of the opposition's attitude towards the mandates won was raised. Some believe that by accepting parliamentary and council mandates, the opposition would practically legalize irregular elections.
"There are disagreements in the opposition about whether parliamentary mandates should be taken. I believe that the position of the majority of citizens is that one should not enter into the legalization of the electoral process by entering the parliament. If we point to unprecedented theft, we cannot accept fabricated results in which we are harmed who knows how much. I see it as accepting the crumbs from the table that Vučić gave to the opposition, no matter how hard-won the percentages are. It is a matter of principle that you do not agree to illegal actions and the outcomes that arise from them. In this sense, the pressure must increase and the political crisis must deepen if we want to wake up the citizens, the international community and, finally, force the government to change the electoral conditions and hold new elections. I fully support ProGlas' request that such repeated elections be held in six months. Refusal to accept mandates is strengthening such a demand and uniting in one front. We can only get there together," says Biljana Stojković, co-president of the Zajedno party.
Dejan Bursać, however, believes that the mandate issue is a "false moralistic dilemma that was put before the opposition".
"If he gives up his mandate, the opposition will return to the position after boycotting the 2020 elections. We know that neither the domestic nor the international public reacted to the boycott and the results of the boycott, at least not to a sufficient extent. By refusing the mandate, the opposition parties would be practically shooting themselves in the foot. They would be excluded from the institutions, they would also be excluded from the little media access, and most importantly - they would remain without institutional funding, that is, they would bring themselves to the edge of survival, to the begging stick. You can't fight SNS if you don't have material resources at your disposal. And the political message could be simple - the opposition won the mandates, and there is no dispute about that. They are protesting because, if there had been no electoral irregularities, she could have won more", says Bursać.
