The President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, often mentions the term "fraternal services" to designate the Serbian and Russian intelligence agencies as partners. In the intelligence world, allied intelligence agencies from other countries are those with which there is established cooperation. In practice, this means that they have formalized relations, usually through bilateral or multilateral agreements on the exchange of information, joint operations or personnel training, but also through informal coordination - services that share the same security or geopolitical interests develop mutual trust and are called "sister" because they function as part of the same "club". For example, the American CIA, the British MI6, the Canadian CSIS, the Australian ASIS and the New Zealand NZSIS form the so-called "Five Eyes" alliance. They are sister services in that framework because they share almost all the collected data and have a very close cooperation.
Director of research at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCBP) Predrag Petrović explains to "Vreme" that the term "fraternal services" does not formally exist, that is, it is not formalized, but that politicians often use it to emphasize that there is a "great intensity of cooperation". He adds that it is based on trust, not instrumentalism. As he adds, the fact that some services are "partner" or even "friendly" indicates "similar views and approaches in solving problems, as well as the foreign policy course of the countries".
The interlocutor from the BCBP further believes that the cooperation of the Serbian services with their western counterparts is "transactional and instrumental", while, as he says, the cooperation with the services in the east, predominantly Russian, is more serious, less transparent, but with more visible consequences.
The editor-in-chief of BIRN in Serbia, Milorad Ivanović, thinks that there are no "fraternal services" in the intelligence world. He says for "Vreme" that it is "exclusively interests". As he claims, even when the states are allies and when there are almost no disagreements between them, "their services lead activities that cannot be called fraternal".
Historically, Yugoslavia was formally non-aligned, so relations with the Soviet services (KGB, GRU) were tense until the end of the 1980s. Officially, the BIA (Security Information Agency) and the FSB (Russian Federal Security Service) have agreements on cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organized crime and cyber-threats. Those agreements have been publicly confirmed several times at directors' meetings. The Serbian Military Intelligence Agency (VOA) and the Military Security Agency (VBA) cooperate with the GRU. Joint military exercises ("Slavic brotherhood") often include elements of the exchange of intelligence practices.
Also worth mentioning is the controversial Center in Niš, opened in 2012 as a Serbian-Russian humanitarian center. Formally, it is a joint center for emergency situations. However, the West sees it as a logistical and intelligence point for Moscow in the Balkans since there were emergency situations, and the reaction from that center was often slow or nonexistent.
And some other Western assessments and reports often warn of the worrisome "presence and influence of Russian intelligence structures" in Serbia, including disinformation campaigns, support for extremist groups, and cyber operations. According to Western reports, part of Russian hybrid operations is conducted through the media and IT infrastructure in Serbia, but neither the government nor the BIA ever admit this publicly. At the same time, there is unofficial information that part of the Serbian personnel is going to Moscow for specialized training.
On the other hand, Milorad Ivanović says that "Russian services are no more or less present in Serbia than others". He believes that they are mostly interested in topics that are of interest to Moscow - "NATO, military cooperation, arms flows to Ukraine, energy", and that Russian intelligence officers are well integrated into Serbian society, educated and understand the local context, "often better than their Western colleagues". He adds that they try not to interfere too much in Serbian domestic affairs because they are "afraid of angering Belgrade", but that they are "certainly active". But, as he says, the most important thing is that they all work in the interest of their countries and that we should not expect any love or understanding.
Photo: TanjugSUSPICIOUS BUSINESSES:
Serbian-Russian humanitarian center
TROUBLE IN PARADISE
That there is trouble in paradise was confirmed by an event in 2019 when a video was leaked showing a Russian intelligence officer giving money to a Serbian officer. Although this event caused a scandal, the authorities in Belgrade relativized it. As the "Guardian" wrote at the time, Georgi Kleban, supposedly the deputy military attaché at the Russian Embassy in Belgrade, and Z. K, a retired Serbian officer, were filmed in an illegal act of handing over money. The recording was allegedly made in December 2018, while Kleban left the embassy in Belgrade in June 2019.
After showing the video, Serbian President Vučić called an emergency meeting of the National Security Council and confirmed that the video is authentic, but also added that it was not the work of Serbian services, but that the services of Western countries were probably involved. That is all that is officially known, and it has never been confirmed that Kleban was formally expelled, as "persona non grata". Unofficially, information circulated that Kleban was recruiting in the Serbian military structure. Citing sources close to official Belgrade, "The Guardian" wrote at the time that there were at least ten contacts with three sources within the Serbian army. Russia called the whole incident a provocation. There is speculation that the release of the video was politically motivated - to show that Serbia is independent enough to respond to the actions of Russian services, to position someone within the country or to influence public opinion.
PEOPLE OF MOSCOW IN BELGRADE
Minister Nenad Popović and ex-minister and ex-director of BIA Aleksandar Vulin, who repeatedly declared himself a pro-Russian politician and said that "Serbia will never impose sanctions on Russia", are mainly responsible for maintaining brotherly relations with the Russians. He often met with representatives of Russian services, including the director of the FSB and heads of other structures. At one time, he personally took to Moscow recordings of Russian opposition members who had been tapped, who were staying in Belgrade.
As the Minister of Police and later Director of the BIA, he announced the strengthening of cooperation with Russia in the fight against terrorism, organized crime and cyber security. That he overdid it in that business, the proof arrived in July 2023 from the US Department of Finance, when this country put him on the "black list" of OFAC sanctions. He is accused of helping to spread malignant Russian influence in the Western Balkans, and that through him Moscow had a channel for influence and operations in the region. Western sources refer to him as "the closest person to Moscow in the government of Serbia".
Vučić himself often repeats how Belgrade became Casablanca, alluding to the increased dynamics, number and operations of various foreign services.
The beginning of the war in Ukraine changed everything in Europe, and in the field of security, it marked the end of looking through the fingers of Russian services on the territory of NATO countries, so already in the first year there was a large number of silent, public expulsions of Russian agents. It is not difficult to conclude that thanks to the "moderate security climate" in Serbia, the number of agents has increased and that they are using Serbia as a more or less safe zone for their activities (see box on arrests in Moldova).
COLORED REVOLUTION, BELOVED SPIN
And while it is quite clear that the partnership with the Western services mainly works to suppress international terrorism and that intelligence data is exchanged - Serbia is interesting here because it is on the route of one of the migrant routes - it is not the most clear what the cooperation with the Russian services consists of. Numerous agreements were signed, and when it was no longer convenient for Vučić to go to Moscow often, he sent his people there for special tasks, most often Vulin, who also signed a certain memorandum on the joint fight of Russian and Serbian services against color revolutions.
And he thanked the Russian services: "I am very grateful to the Russian special services who always support us in our fight against color revolutions, primarily with information. They know the danger that threatens Serbia. We have very good communication and I am very grateful for that," said Vulin on March 21 of this year in an interview with RIA Novosti. On that occasion, he reminded that previously the special services of Russia and Serbia officially agreed to cooperate in the fight against color revolutions and that this is still in force. He then pointed out that he respects the citizens who participate in the protests, but that there should be no foreign interference in these processes.
This is not the first time that Serbian and Russian officials talk together about the color revolution in Serbia. This spin has found its way onto the table during every major protest of the last few years. Alluding to Euromaidan in Ukraine in 2014 when Western support for the protesters was more than evident, the narrative of Maidan and "color revolutions" aims to delegitimize any popular uprising in Serbia by creating a false image of an orchestrated performance in which the citizens on the streets are only puppets, while the real strings are allegedly pulled by Western services and unnamed political powers. At the same time, the regime often boasts of good relations and mutual visits by the leaders of the same Western countries, which the deposed Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych certainly could not boast of in 2014.
On the other hand, Serbia is useful to Russia as a stronghold in the Western Balkans, but also as a base for displaced intelligence operations and agents, after the Russian attack on Ukraine. Petrović adds that a large number of Russians who are "connected with the military and security structures" received Serbian citizenship, as well as that expelled Russian intelligence officers from Western countries found refuge in Serbia.
HYBRID WARFARE SPECIALISTS
Among other activities, SRV specializes in hybrid work. This sphere is one of their most recognizable characteristics. Colonel Sergei Tretyakov, a former member of the service who defected to the US, said that he sent operatives to public libraries in the US to spread Russian propaganda (pre-prepared materials created by the SVR expert team) on educational websites and e-mails to the US media. The idea of this action was to present Russia and Russian foreign policy in a positive light.
This service is occasionally associated with the public and with hacker groups. Petrović says that it is not typical for them, but that there is an established connection with the APT group Cozy Bear, responsible for a series of attacks on state institutions in several Western countries.
WHO IS CONDUCTING MAIDAN IN SERBIA?
In a statement published at the beginning of last week, the SVR, in addition to the EU as a "sponsor" of the Maidan, accused several independent media outlets of conducting it by "brainwashing" the youth, and receiving money from Brussels for this. In addition to "Vremen", Fonet and Južni Vesti, the list also includes a number of smaller, that is, local media. The selection of these media was probably achieved by downloading a list of all media supported by one donor in a certain project cycle. That would explain why there are not a few more independent media outlets, which are also often targeted as "Maidan participants" (for the simple reason that they did not receive funding that year), as well as media operating within the United Group (media outlets that are part of corporations do not receive projects intended for independent media).
Commenting on the list of media that allegedly implement Maidan in Serbia, Milorad Ivanovic says that "everyone who follows the media scene knows that it is nonsense." He adds that these media are barely surviving and do not have the power attributed to them. As he says, "even those in Moscow know that." He believes that "all public messages of the intelligence services should be viewed through the prism of hidden meanings", and that what is written in the announcement "is mostly not what is actually meant", but that both those who send the message and those to whom it is addressed know very well what the real message is. It is the same with the last announcement of the SVR: "The EU is criticizing you and you are losing their support. We are left for you, but you have to fulfill your promises", he explains that this is how he interprets the announcement. "What was promised already belongs to the realm of speculation," concludes the interlocutor.
Predrag Petrović says that he is not surprised that the SVR signed behind this statement because it is part of what this service deals with - propaganda, spreading disinformation, political influence on public opinion. He explains that for intelligence agencies, in addition to collecting data through diplomatic channels, a network of secret agents and illegals, hybrid work, that is, influencing public opinion, is extremely important.
When asked if it is realistic for SVR to deal with small local media in Serbia, the interlocutor from BCBP answers that it is "very difficult", that it would be a waste of resources. He says that it is rather the case that "our side published that information" with the aim of spreading misinformation. A good part of the work goes through partners or "fraternal services", which collect part of the data in the field.
Referring to the Russian services gives legitimacy to the claims about the Maidan and the color revolution that the government puts forward, believes Petrović. In addition to persuading the already convinced, these narratives also try to influence the pro-Russian demonstrators - to show that the protests are not just a spontaneous rebellion, but that the European Union, which is organizing the new Maidan in Serbia, is allegedly behind them. Also, in the moments when the intensity of criticism from Brussels has partially increased towards the response of the Serbian authorities to the demonstrations, this announcement also sends a message from the outside that Belgrade can turn even more towards Moscow if the need arises.
In hybrid work, Russian services actively use social networks. It is noticeable that these same narratives have been intensively marketed through various social networks for months. A good example is the X network, formerly Twitter. There is a series of accounts whose task is to "reveal" how much a certain media or organization has received from Western donors. Of course, those funds are automatically classified as money intended for the color revolution in Serbia. After that, these narratives circulate in the media corridors for days. However, as a rule, it is systematically skipped stating that the majority of these same donors regularly donated funds and implemented projects with state institutions as well.
If Belgrade really became Casablanca, or something similar to Estoril in Stanković's novel, then it is not surprising that services are ubiquitous in daily political life. When asked to what extent services are abused, Milorad Ivanovic cites the example of a guest appearance by Vojislav Šešelj on TV Informer, in which he stated that a group of Palestinians, journalists and editors of NBC television, allegedly help students and work to overthrow the regime. He knew in which hotel they were staying, with whom they were meeting, which, as the interlocutor says, is a sign that "their every step is under surveillance." The trade, Ivanovic explains, was created a few weeks later when the Serbian ambassador in Washington, Dragan Šutanovac, boasted that he had participated in the "rescue" of Palestinian NBC journalists through Serbia, and all the texts declaring them spies "disappeared".
"It is a classic example of how the services are misused for daily political purposes. When it suits them, they will announce that NBC journalists are spies who bring down Vučić, when it suits them otherwise, they will show how our services saved the same NBC journalists in a heroic action", concludes the interlocutor, adding that "one and the other news come from the same kitchen".
Russian intelligence services
The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation - SVR is the successor of the Soviet KGB in the field of foreign intelligence. It was founded in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR, when the KGB was divided into several agencies; its main job is to collect and analyze intelligence data from abroad - political, economic, scientific and military. The SVR is a civil service in charge of the diplomatic and "classic" intelligence network abroad. The importance of an agency such as the SVR is also indicated by the fact that its predecessor dates back to 1920, when a special, foreign department was established within the then revolutionary secret police Cheka.
It is one of the three most important Russian agencies, along with the FSB and the GRU. The FSB (Federal Security Service) operates within Russia and in the post-Soviet space. The GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense) is focused on military intelligence, often more aggressive and operational (cyber, special operations). Compared to the GRU, the SVR is a small but sophisticated service. However, these two services work closely together in the field. Predrag Petrović tells "Vreme" that the SVR is doing "some kind of political and strategic ground preparation for stronger GRU and FSB operations."
The SVR is seen as the successor to the tradition of the First Administration of the KGB (foreign intelligence service). It is considered to be valid for a more elite and discreet service than the GRU. In some Western analyses, the SVR is often associated with long-term political influence and networks, while the GRU is synonymous with "dirtier" operations (assassinations, sabotage, cyber attacks). Also, the SVR belongs to pure intelligence services because it is exclusively engaged in intelligence work. By way of comparison, the Serbian Security and Information Agency (BIA) is classified as a mixed service because, in addition to intelligence, it also deals with security and counterintelligence activities.
GRU trains in Serbia and Moldova
Just before the end of this article, the news appeared that the Moldovan security services had detained 74 people who were allegedly trained in Serbia and Moldova to destabilize protests and cause incidents. According to Moldovan officials, 111 persons who underwent training were identified, and a large amount of weapons, ammunition, camouflage equipment, as well as phones and SIM cards were seized. These are younger persons, aged from 19 to 45 years. They were allegedly recruited through the "Shor Group" and the Telegram channel, and the organizers of the operation were identified as two Russian citizens, at least one of whom is connected to the GRU, according to a statement from the Moldovan security services. One of the organizers has been identified, while the other is still known only under the code name "Bes".
