There is a moment in long reigns when power he stops wondering how to manage, and starts wondering how much longer he can last. Serbia entered that moment at the beginning of 2025. The fall of Miloš Vučević's government in January was the first serious institutional signal that the system no longer manages to absorb social discontent. The resignation was presented as a responsible act, but in reality it seemed like an admission of impotence. The government became an expendable part of the mechanism that had to preserve the center of power.
The fall of the canopy at the Railway Station in Novi Sad was not just another construction incident. The canopy has become a symbol of the way in which the SNS governs the country: without clear responsibility, without transparency and with a reflex to dilute the blame. The protests that followed were not a passing wave, but a continuous pressure.
Vucevic's government did not fall because it made a mistake, but because it could no longer feign stability. On the other hand, the fall of the Vucevic government in January of this year can be interpreted as one of a series of political tricks of the regime, which at that time still hoped to appease the rebellious citizens. The trick didn't work because people can't be fooled anymore. The veil fell from the citizens' eyes at about the same time as the canopy.
In another attempt to amortize the crisis, in April the regime chooses Đura Mazut as the new prime minister. He was the ideal candidate for a moment in which a figure without political weight, without a base, without a party and without room for independent decision-making is sought. Thus, the formal executive power was further emptied, and the real power was even more concentrated outside the government, in one man.
The change of prime minister was not a sign of reform, but an acknowledgment that the government no longer relies on institutions. That abandonment of the government from institutions and the application of non-institutional mechanisms became the leitmotif of this year and this phase of Aleksandar Vučić's rule. If the fall of the government was, at least formally, a recognition of the weakness of the executive power, the situation in the parliament showed the depth of the institutional crisis. The incident with smoke bombs and torches in the Parliament was not a surprise, but the culmination of a process in which Parliament lost its political function. The assembly ceased to be a place of conflict of arguments and became a scene of symbolic gestures.
The government used that event to talk about violence and the attempt to destabilize the state, but there was no answer to the essential question: why the institutions are no longer perceived as relevant. By its behavior, the opposition has shown that it sees the Assembly as a backdrop, not as a decision-making space. This left the parliament stuck between formal power and actual insignificance. It was a clear indication that the government was no longer trying to produce consent, but to maintain control. When institutions lose their authority, the government must find another way to maintain itself. In Serbia, this method increasingly became a force.
photo: marija jankovićGREAT VICTORY OF THE CITIZENS: Prevented the demolition of the cultural and historical building - the General Staff complex
THE ONLY MINISTER IN THE GOVERNMENT
In a year of political instability, the economy became a key instrument of control. In that space, Siniša Mali finally profiled himself as the most powerful man in the government, the previous and the current one. As prime ministers changed, his influence grew. Control of the budget, investments and large projects turned the Ministry of Finance into a central political department.
The "General Staff" and "Canopy" affairs were not isolated cases. They have exposed a pattern in which public resources are used with minimal transparency and maximum political protection. Criticisms from the professional public and citizens were met with a wall of silence or aggressive defense. The authorities insisted on the narrative of development, while there was no answer to questions of responsibility.
In the government of Đura Macuta, Mali remained a constant. It was a clear message that formal changes do not mean a change in the center of power. The economy was used as a means of stabilizing the regime, not as public policy. Investments have become a political tool, and the budget a loyalty mechanism.
But Mali is not such a dramatic figure in Matsuto's government because he is the finance minister. He is the Minister of Finance because he is a person trusted by President Vučić. That is why it is safe to say that the puppet government of Đura Mazut has only one ministry - the one headed by Mali, whatever it is called.
POLICE, EXTENDED ARM OF THE REGIME
Since the beginning of the year, student protests have been one of the strongest forms of social discontent in Serbia. The first large rally was held on February 1 in Novi Sad, when students, after several weeks of gathering and marching from Belgrade and other cities, blocked three key bridges in the city - Varadinski, Žeželjev and Most slobode - symbolically marking three months since the disaster at the railway station in which 15 people lost their lives (later that number would increase to 16), and whose causes remained politically disputed issues.
The protest was massive, as the students traveled dozens of kilometers on foot or by bicycle, with the support of local communities and citizens who welcomed them with food and smiles on the way to the event center. The blockade of the bridges lasted for hours, and the students insisted on "three bridges in three months" as a metaphor for the continuity of the fight against irresponsibility and corruption.
On the following February 15, in Kragujevac, the protest took on a new dimension and the title "Let's meet at Sretenje". The rally lasted for 15 hours, symbolically in memory of the 15 victims of the carport in Novi Sad. Students came on foot from Novi Sad, Belgrade, Niš and other cities to join the gathering, which was created in response to the slowness and lack of transparency in the investigation of the tragedy.
The climax of the series of protests took place on March 15 in Belgrade, when students and citizens organized a large gathering under the slogan "15 for 15" - symbolically connecting the number 15 with the victims of the accident and with demands for justice and responsibility. The gathering was massive, with hundreds of thousands of people in the center of Belgrade, mostly in front of the Assembly and on Slavija Square.
During 2025, the police became a more visible political actor than ever before, not through statements or institutional reforms, but through the way they used force. The summer and autumn months laid bare the process that had been simmering for years - turning the police from a public security service into an instrument of preserving political control.
July in Belgrade was a turning point. Numerous cases of excessive use of force were recorded during the multi-day protests. Videos of police officers breaking student blockades with batons, knocking protesters onto the asphalt and detaining people without a clear reason circulated on social networks and the media. The official reaction was predictable. The Ministry of Internal Affairs announced that the police acted professionally and in accordance with the law, while the testimonies of the injured and lawyers remained without an institutional response.
A similar pattern was repeated in September in Novi Sad. The protests, which brought together a large number of students and citizens, met with an even tougher response from the police. This time the violence was not just a reaction to alleged incidents, but a pre-prepared tactic. Cordons, suppression, mass arrests and intimidation became part of the standard repertoire. This made it clear that the state no longer distinguishes between protest and a threat to order.
In this context, the role of Marko Kričko, a police official whose name was mentioned more and more often in connection with actions during the protests, is also significant. Kricak recently became the head of the Criminal Police Directorate, which was interpreted in professional circles as a reward for loyalty and not as a result of professional criteria. His promotion came at a time when complaints about police brutality were loudest, adding to the impression that repressive behavior is not being sanctioned but encouraged. Igor Žmirić was appointed the head of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ). He is known as a Vučić loyalist who spent the summer playing with students and an assistant to Marko Kričko.
The law has not formally changed, but its purpose has. The police stopped being a neutral arbiter of public order and became the first line of defense of political power that can no longer count on consent. Therefore, brutality is not an incident, it is a strategy of the government's struggle against its own citizens.
VUCIĆ'S RAW FORCE
Aleksandar Vučić's rhetoric during 2025 followed a clear pattern: as real political control weakened, the language became harder, more personal, and more openly threatening. The president addressed himself less and less as an arbiter of the system, and more often as its immediate executor.
In connection with the student protests, Vučić persistently insisted on the narrative of external conspiracy and manipulation. He called the students "manipulated", the protests "politically instructed", and the demands "meaningless". In one of his speeches, he said that he "will not allow the streets to lead the state", thus equating any form of civil pressure with an attempt to destroy order. Thus, a peaceful protest was discursively transformed into a security problem.
When it comes to police interventions, the president consistently defended the actions of the security forces, repeating that they "acted with extreme restraint" and that "nowhere in Europe would they tolerate such behavior of demonstrators". The use of force was relativized with comparisons and insinuations, while recordings and testimonies of citizens were systematically declared lies or manipulations.
Vučić took a particularly worrying tone in relation to the judiciary. During the year, he publicly attacked the prosecutors on several occasions, accusing them of "inaction", "political bias" and "protection of criminals". He went the furthest when, talking about possible investigations, he mentioned the pardon institute, with the message that "he will not allow the state to collapse because of someone's political ambitions." That statement was not just political pressure, but an open message about the hierarchy of power in which the judiciary occupies a subordinate position.
Vučić's attacks on the prosecutor's office culminated in claims that "some prosecutors work against the state", which turned institutional criticism into a question of loyalty. In such a framework, the law ceases to be a neutral mechanism and becomes a tool in the political conflict.
The common denominator of all these statements is the personalization of power. The president speaks in the first person singular, assumes the role of protector of order, interpreter of laws and corrector of institutions. This sends a clear message that the system works as long as he is its guarantor. Anything beyond that is a threat.
In 2025, Vučić's words no longer served to appease the public. They served to discipline her. When the president publicly threatens institutions, it is not a weakness of the system, but a message about where the real decision-making center is. The rule of law then ceases to be a framework, and becomes an obstacle that the government bypasses or suppresses.
Local elections in Kosjerić, Zaječar, Mionica and Negotin showed an additional dimension of the problem. The formal victories of SNS were narrow, the campaigns were aggressive, and there was no celebration. These were victories to be defended, not ones that confirm legitimacy.
In Mionica, one of the three cities where elections were held on November 30, election day was marked by incidents that went beyond the usual tensions. The observers from Novi Sad, who came to monitor the election process, had their vehicle tires slashed during the night, which directly jeopardized their work and freedom of movement on the day of voting. Such actions, although still the subject of unofficial reports, indicate an atmosphere in which election supervision is being attempted to be undermined before voting begins. Supporters and opponents of the Mionica regime often had conflicting narratives about the nature of the incidents. While the government claimed that these were isolated individual cases that were quickly resolved by law enforcement agencies, citizens and opposition observers assessed that such events were part of a broader strategy of creating an atmosphere of fear and disorientation among voters. The presence of the police in full gear further fueled the feeling that the elections were neither free nor safe.
In Zajecar, the local elections held on June 8, 2025 became one of the most disputed cases of that year. According to official results, the list of the Serbian Progressive Party won 47,12 percent of the vote and formed the new city assembly, but the opposition immediately threw out a series of allegations of irregularities, pointing to pressure on observers, irregularities in voter lists and cases of violations of the secrecy of voting. With the decision made on October 8, the High Court in Zaječar for the second time made a decision that the Assembly of Zaječar was not constituted in accordance with the law. The Minister of State Administration and Local Self-Government Snežana Paunović ignored the court decision and announced that the ministry she leads will order that the parliamentary sessions continue.
That's how it was. Despite the law and court decision, the second constitutive session was held. It was marked by incidents in the assembly hall, when private security guards literally beat opposition councilors.
Serbia in 2025 shows a pattern of government that no longer rules through consent, but through endurance. The fall of Vučević's government, the puppet role of Đura Macut, the concentration of power around Siniša Malog, repression of students and pressure on the judiciary form a coherent picture of a system that is losing control over society.
WITHOUT FRIENDS
Relations between Serbia and the European Union during 2025 formally remained within the framework of the well-known language of the "European path", but essentially entered the phase of open distrust. The turning point occurred in November when representatives of the European Parliament appeared at one of the large protests in Novi Sad. The President of Serbia publicly insulted European parliamentarians, accusing them of interfering in internal affairs and of "supporting the destabilization of the state" and calling them "the worst scum." That speech was not an incident but a message: European criticism is no longer perceived as a relevant corrective.
Soon after, the European Parliament's Resolution on Serbia followed, in which police repression, pressure on the judiciary, election conditions and the government's attitude towards civil protests were strongly criticized. The resolution noted a serious setback in the area of the rule of law and called on the European Commission to review the further dynamics of the accession negotiations. Although formally non-binding, the resolution had a strong political effect: it clearly showed that the patience of the European institutions was running out.
But that was not the end of the regime's foreign policy woes. In October, it was the turn of the American sanctions against the NIS. They were postponed several times, which Vučić explained by his political skills. However, it turned out that the delay was due to the work of the Croatian lawyer Janaf, who has a smaller share in the ownership of NIS.
The president, known for boasting that he has great friends all over the world, was left without his friend Turkish President Erdogan. Namely, Turkey sold Kosovo the drones it produces and thus finally showed Vucic what has been known for a long time: Turkey has been helping Kosovo militarily for years and between Vucic and Albin Kurti, it prefers the latter.
FINAL UNBEARING
The government's transition to open repression in 2025 did not happen suddenly. It was gradual, almost administrative, but therefore irreversible. When all the mechanisms of simulation of dialogue, participation and semblance of stability were exhausted, bare force remained as the last stronghold of control.
Repression no longer hid behind phrases about law and order. It has become a daily practice. Police brutality, mass arrests of students, the use of sound cannons, public pressure on prosecutors' offices and courts formed the same crisis management logic. Instead of a political answer, a security paradigm was offered. Instead of conversations - cordons, and instead of institutions - personal will. What distinguishes this phase of government from previous ones is the absence of the need for justification. Vučić no longer asks for consent, nor does he try to convince. He demands obedience, and repression is not a consequence of power, but its substitute. As the real power weakened, as the election results became closer and the protests more massive, the use of force became more visible and brutal. Paradoxically, the repression further exposed the weaknesses of the system. Every baton, every arrest and every threat to the judiciary showed that the government no longer controls society, but tries to control it. Students and citizens did not respond by escalating violence, but by persistence.
In 2025, Serbia entered a phase where the question of whether the government has authoritarian tendencies no longer arises. The question is how long a system can survive relying solely on repression. History shows that such systems fail not because they are attacked, but because they lose legitimacy, a process that cannot be stopped by force.
photo: lazar novaković / fonetSERBIAN AND BOSNIA COMMUNITY: Citizens from all over Serbia in Novi Pazar, December 21, 2025.
CITIZENS, HUGGED AND CRYING
If for years the government counted on fatigue, wasted energy and fear, 2025 showed that a different kind of resistance appeared before it. Citizens have learned that protest is not an event, but a process. That it does not end with a speech, nor does it depend on a single request. Protests have become a space for political maturation, not a vent for frustration.
The most visible symbol of that change was the unity that formed between students from different parts of Serbia, including students from Novi Pazar. In a country where for years the government built politics on divisions, fear and controlled mistrust, the scenes of joint columns, banners and slogans seemed almost subversive. Students from Novi Pazar were not guests, nor an exotic addition to the protests. They were part of the same front, equal and visible, without the need to explain their presence.
photo: lazar novaković / fonetNovi Pazar, December 21, 2025.
That unity was not declarative. It was seen in the way people protected each other, in collective decisions not to respond to provocations, in insisting on peace even when the state showed nervousness. This is exactly where the regime showed its weakness. Because the government does not have a ready answer against citizens who do not agree to the roles it has assigned them. The reaction of the regime was expected, but less and less effective. The protests were called politically motivated, the students manipulated, and the citizens naive. However, the irony is that the government, repeating those phrases, actually admitted defeat. Because there is no propaganda that can explain why the same people return to the streets again and again for months. There is no external factor that can produce persistence.
In 2025, the citizens also changed in that they no longer looked for leaders. They did not wait for a signal from the stage, nor did they expect salvation from the election. They learned that pressure is itself a political fact. In this quiet transformation lies the biggest problem for the government. A regime based on control does not know what to do with people who have stopped being afraid.
And so the answer was force. Police, threats, relativization of violence. But repression did not restore authority. It only further exposed the weakness of a system that no longer knows how to manage consent. In 2025, the protests didn't just show how dissatisfied society was. They showed that it has changed, and in front of the changed citizens, this regime seems taken aback.
Citizens and students learned something crucial during this year: that repression works only when the individual is alone. The moment fear becomes collective, it stops paralyzing and starts connecting. This is precisely why the protests have persisted. Not because they were perfectly organized, but because they were persistent. Not because they promised quick wins, but because they refused to disappear.
Resistance to repression does not have to be heroic to be effective. It is enough to be consistent. Every peaceful protest, every rejection of provocation, every insistence on solidarity diminishes the space in which force can operate. A regime that counts on fatigue and waste has faced a society that has learned to last. The fight against repression will not be short, nor easy. But 2025 has shown that she is no longer alone, and that is the point of no return. Because the government can control the institutions, the media and the police, but it cannot bring back the time when citizens believed they had no choice.
Big holiday discount on "Vreme" - subscriptions 25 percent cheaper until mid-January. Give it away subscription to yourself or to someone else, read what matters.
