We will certainly see elections in 2026.
Maybe it won't be the ones they've been looking for so much students at the helm, followed by massively dissatisfied citizens. Those main, parliamentary elections, which, before the uprising of the people, the government held every now and then. Now, when the citizens are looking for them - the regime will try in every way to complete the entire mandate. In almost 14 years in power, it would be only their second time.
Some elections, and important ones, Serbia will still get in 2026. Next local campaigns in Arandjelovac, Bor, Bajana Bašta, Kladovo, Knjaževac, Kula, as well as Lucani, Majdanpek, Smederevska Palanka and Sevojno.
"Next year we will have regular elections in ten municipalities," Ivan Stanojević, assistant professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, told "Vreme" about political expectations for the year after the incredible 2025. "If those elections are called, the regime will not be able to 'cover' all municipalities, as was the case this year, when elections were called in only three municipalities at the same time."
The assistant professor of the FPN thinks that the government no longer has the energy and potential to make any significant change and that the only thing it can do is to deepen the suffering of the rebellious people, but that will not last much longer.
"That's why it's important for people to be positive, solidary, constructive and ready to win freedom," he adds.
While Stanojević believes that from January we will have "a year of continued democratic maturation of the people in Serbia", as well as "a period of continued collapse of the evil regime", Jelena Cupać, a researcher at the Berlin Center for Social Sciences WZB, predicts for "Vreme" a year in which students, who still enjoy a high degree of trust, will be mostly engaged in preparing for the elections.
The government, she thinks, will "try to exhaust people through everyday micro-conflicts with the policy of permanent crisis".
Every free municipality means
Stanojević explains that "liberating at least one municipality will speed things up significantly."
"The rebel people will realize that the struggle is yielding results and that the final victory and freedom are close, which will give them a wind behind them. On the other hand, people who support the evil regime, despite the regime's propaganda, will begin to understand that it is over. That is why I would not be surprised if the elections are not held, especially the parliamentary elections, which are not yet due," he thinks.
The assistant professor of FPN thinks that, what they are regular parliamentary elections on the plan only in November 2027, we should not take it for granted, but we should hope for faster elections, as a civilized and institutional path for the country's exit from the crisis and a peaceful change of government.
"During the thirteen years of the evil regime, the elections have become just a shell and a facade. They have long been neither free nor fair. The media with national frequencies, and almost everyone else, have been usurped," says Stanojević.
"Nevertheless, even in such circumstances, the regime can no longer win. In the local elections of 2025, they seized power despite the electoral will of the citizens and the legally binding decisions of the judicial authorities. They had to do this in municipalities that were previously their safe strongholds. They avoided calling elections for local communities in Vojvodina."
Problems of polycrisis experts
Jelena Cupać, a researcher from Berlin, thinks that the calling of "big", ie parliamentary elections, will depend primarily on Vučić's political calculation, and much less on internal demands or external pressures.
"For him, the decision to go to the polls implies a complex calculation in the circumstances of the polycrisis (simultaneous external and internal pressures) in which his regime currently finds itself," Cupać told "Vreme".
"Support for Vučić is in decline, and the key question for him is whether that decline can be stopped and stabilized, that is, whether Vučić can consolidate it and the electorate at a certain level, through the already proven narrative of internal and external enemies. And with such reduced, but disciplined support, still win the elections."
At the same time, Vučić is aware that the elections at this moment would almost certainly mean a better organization of the opposition scene, both political parties and the student movement. Nevertheless, the political scientist thinks that the elections in the current climate would very likely become a "catalyst of violence, similar to what we witnessed in several previous local elections."
"The public's tolerance for various forms of electoral manipulations today is significantly lower than before, and at the republican level, the regime would hardly be able to control such an escalation. In that case, the elections could turn into an event that seriously calls into question the very survival of the government," adds Cupać.
Given that it is not Vučić's manner to call elections at a moment when there is a real risk of defeat, she believes that he will push their calling until the legally last moment, in anticipation of a more favorable political climate for himself, such as conflicts in the opposition part of the public and less pressure from abroad.
"If, however, he decides to call the elections earlier, it could be understood as a signal that he is ready to leave the 'hot potato' that is Serbia today to someone else," Cupać thinks.
What can we expect from students?
Ivan Stanojević expects a routine continuation student struggles. The student movement is by far the dominant political actor in the country and has stable support from all levels of society, as well as the potential for growth of that support, he is convinced.
"Students are working hard on harmonizing the electoral list and putting together programs with the greatest experts this country has. In addition, actions "a student in every village" i door-to-door campaigns they reach people who are still in the media darkness and under the propaganda control of the regime," he says.
After all, the assistant professor adds, demography, and with it the passage of time, benefit the student movement. High school students who are enthusiastic about the student struggle come of age, get the right to vote and enroll in universities. On the other hand, the average voter of the regime is a pensioner, and the passage of time does not favor that social group.
And Cupać thinks that the students will only be thinking about the elections and how to create as normal conditions as possible in which the whole of Serbia will vote. He believes that the focus of the student movement will shift more and more towards the preparations for those elections. This entails a whole series of activities: from pressure to call elections in general, through the formation of a student list, to a field campaign, "door-to-door" work and training of election controllers," says the researcher.
"In that sense, we will probably witness a decrease in the intensity of protest activities, but not their complete disappearance. Protests remain in reserve, as a mechanism that can be activated if some event requires a mass exit to the streets," he adds.
Problems from outside
The two-faced international policy, which marked and permanently injured the country in 2025, is slowly paying for the regime. Vučić's "friendships" were best demonstrated by example Oil Industry of Serbia, because the the country ended up threatened by Russia, which he has been defending for decades and refuses to impose sanctions on. Relations with America are the worst in the last few years, because Serbia won the highest possible tariffs in the region, and the road to the EU was stopped by the government itself - with complete lack of interest.
"They again led Serbia into isolation and under sanctions, just like when they were in power the last time at the end of the nineties," says Ivan Stanojević. "In addition to the fronts on which it fights against the youth, the educational system, culture, independent media, the judiciary, the civil sector and farmers, the regime now has open fronts towards Brussels and Washington, and one would say towards Moscow."
In those circumstances, he adds, a rational actor would try to make an agreement or compromise that would reduce the number and level of hostilities. However, a rational actor would not even get into this situation.
Although it may seem that such external pressures could accelerate the fall of the regime, they can also produce the opposite effect, reminds Jelena Cupać. Not necessarily through the growth of support for Vučić, but through stopping its further loss and temporary consolidation of power, since it opens up the possibility for him to present external actors even more strongly as enemy forces, and himself as a savior, in a manner reminiscent of Slobodan Milošević.
"However, it is important to emphasize that these pressures on Serbia will not result from the fact that Serbia itself is in focus, but are rather echoes of global geostrategic regroupings and internal political shifts, mostly in the USA and the countries of the European Union", thinks Cupać.
"Here I mean, first of all, the strengthening of the right, as well as the already present authoritarian and, we can safely say, fascist tendencies in those societies. These movements are often overlooked, insufficiently understood or misinterpreted in Serbia, which means that even a future, pro-democratic political option, should there be a change of government, will not easily deal with them."
What will the subjects do?
An important question for Stanojević is - will individuals at the top of the regime behave rationally for themselves or for the regime?
"Will they blindly follow the leader who is dragging the country, themselves and them into the abyss, or will they look for a rational solution? Those solutions can be fleeing the country, cooperating with the prosecution or some other external actor, and finally some kind of attempt to create a coalition within the regime that would aim to preserve part of the privileges if it contributes to the downfall of the regime from the inside or changes the leaders. Each of these moves would accelerate the collapse and downfall of the regime," he mentions.
For each of these moves there are examples from practice of the fall of non-democratic regimes. It remains to be seen how individuals within the system will think and act.
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