In the jaws of political crisis

We have a new record holder for French political ephemera. Sebastien Lecorny (39), perhaps the last of the president's most loyal associates Emanuel Macron (in various ministerial positions since 2017 and Macron's coming to power) held the position of prime minister for as many as 27 days (Barnier's previous record was less than 90), while his government can be considered the absolute short-lived record holder, because from the appointment on Sunday, October 5, 2025, in the evening hours until Lecorne's resignation on Monday, October 6 in the morning, he did not complete even 15 hours. A cynic would add that those rare newly appointed ministers in it did not even have time to honestly submit their resignations to the National Assembly office, let alone visit their ministries, and they have already resigned (with the right to default three-month compensation - read, the minister's salary - and to the general delight of the most socially and economically oppressed layers of the population).

Therefore, let's try, as much as possible for one week, to sketch the most recent cross-section of the situation and summarize almost live-stream "echoes and reactions", and above all speculation about the latest and hitherto unseen political moment in recent French political history, despite the fact that events have been catching up and being overtaken since yesterday morning until the conclusion of this text (Tuesday evening).

DIALECTIC OF THE HEAD AND THE WALL

How do they say about the one who "making the same moves, hoping for a different outcome"? (Indian stubborn, the children's poet would say). After the debacle of Michel Barnier and the impeachment of his government in December 2024 and the even more bitter taste of the impoverishment and nine ingloriously wasted months of Prime Minister François Bayrou, for whom the vote of no confidence in the Parliament at the beginning of last September was a relief for almost everyone, President Macron pulled perhaps his last ace up his sleeve by appointing Lecorny, all in an effort to, despite the balance of power in the Parliament (not to mention the wider public opinion), re-establish a government articulated around its policy (which one exactly, it is not known) and its coalition bloc, the so-called "common platform" consisting of Macron's (now more Attal's) Renaissance and several right-of-center parties, primarily Bayrou's Modem and Horizonti, also of former prime minister Edouard Philippe.

Having announced a clear break with his predecessors (although his appointment itself does not represent a break at all but a stubborn confirmation of continuity), after three weeks of conspiratorial meetings with various political partners, Lekorni initially provided some positive signals, first of all by announcing that he would not invoke the famous and equally controversial Article 49.3 of the Constitution when adopting the new budget, which clearly put everyone in the parliament (especially the left and extreme right opposition) before their own political responsibility. Despite a few more, mainly cosmetic concessions (certainly towards the right side of the political spectrum), Lekorni announced on Sunday the composition of the new government with three-quarters of the same ministers as in the previous Bayru's government, which suffered a shipwreck.

To make the Monty Pythonism of the "breakup" even greater, the "icing on the cake" was the appointment of Bruno Le Maire as the Minister of Defense, which was also the direct reason for the new/old Minister of the Interior and the head of the "classical Degolovian" right-wing Republicans, the virulent Bruno Retajo, to cancel his participation in the Government and force Lecorni to resign. To remind you, Bruno Le Maire - popularly known as "Mr. Thousand Billions" - represents the embodiment of the French budget slippage and the stratospheric increase in public debt, initiated even before covid with the already legendary slogan "whatever the cost". Let's also add that after last summer's Macron's election debacle, Le Maire arbitrarily withdrew from politics "forever", having found a lucrative uvrezeite retreat on the tame shores of Lake Geneva.

How was it, the same political moves (a cynic would add, with the same people in the same positions), but a different outcome?

photo: ap photo

POSSIBLE OPTIONS

Before we return to a deeper consideration of the impasse from which the French political elite cannot be extricated, let us list the four options that are currently available to President Macron.

Theoretically, the first option would be to re-appoint Lekorni or someone from the "common platform" camp. However, Macron's stubborn refusal to implement his own policy (no matter what it represented) led to a total decline in his rating and an almost visceral rejection (practically open hatred) of broad sections of society towards everything that represents Macron, "Macronism" and "Macronia" in general, as Macron's system and technology of government are colloquially called.

Another option would be to appoint a prime minister from the left camp (according to last year's election results), but apart from the fact that such "momentum" has long since passed, such a government would probably be even shorter-lived than the previous three, because a majority for its immediate recall would be easily found.

The third and perhaps the least likely politically would be the option of appointing a technocratic government (following the Italian model of Mario Draghi) which would bridge the period until the next presidential elections in May 2027 with "current affairs" and some minimally consensual budget.

Finally, the fourth and probably inevitable option would be the re-dissolution of the National Assembly and the calling of new extraordinary parliamentary elections, the result of which - that is, the balance of power in the new parliament - would, according to many, not be fundamentally different from the current one, except that Macron's coalition would be crowned even more, and the far-right National Assembly (RN) of Marine Le Pen would increase its ranks.

There is also a fifth option called for by both the RN and the radical left LFI of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and that would be the resignation of President Macron, which for now, at least according to the first interested party, is out of the question. The MPs of the LFI even initiated the process of impeachment of the president in front of the parliament, although such an outcome has no prospects of success due to the extremely complicated constitutional-legal procedure that it requires (besides that there is no valid legal or political reason for it).

POLITICAL CRISIS OR REGIME CRISIS?

In the spirit of his extremely free interpretation of his own constitutional powers (remember last year's unprovoked extension of the full powers of the government in resignation for a full week, despite the resignation of Gabriel Atal within the constitutional deadline of 24 hours), Macron, having previously accepted Lecorne's resignation, and after the self-initiated withdrawal of Bruno Le Maire after the chaos caused by his appointment, asked for two more days of "last chance negotiations" until Wednesday evening, when, in case of another failure, Macron will finally take his share of responsibility and announce his decision. To make things even more ridiculous, Lekorni accepted the new task, specifying however that he does not see himself at the head of such a "muscle-stretched" government.

The question that permeates French politics especially since last year's elections is actually an artificial dilemma. Numerous constitutionalists and specialists in public law agree that this is a deep political, parliamentary and party crisis, which, in truth, has shown certain limits of the Fifth Republic, but it is by no means a crisis of the regime, in other words, a crisis of the state and the structure of government in France, since French institutions have shown an exceptional degree of resistance to the current more than turbulent political circumstances (especially the party scandals and aporias that were characteristic of the Fourth Republic, but also proved to be fatal).

We are talking about a change in the political paradigm insofar as the era of finding necessary political compromises has come due to the fragmentation (at least tripartism) of the balance of power in the Parliament, none of which is even close to a relative, let alone an absolute, majority in the Parliament, as was the case in France until now, with the classic two political camps - left and right. In this sense, French politicians should better emulate their European partners (Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium or Italy at least) where broad coalitions and necessary compromises are the only way to overcome the sometimes and more than accumulated problems. Hence Lekorni's regret that "for some, the party is more important than the fatherland".

Of course, all political calculations and intra-party divisions (already proverbial among leftists, and recently also among increasingly right-wing Republicans), in which parts of the party vacillate between supporting a future Macronist government and explicitly distancing themselves from "participation" in the total collapse of Macron's political idea and its devastating balance in the perspective of future elections: local elections next spring, then presidential in May 2027.

As for Melancholy's LFI, and especially RN Marine Le Pen (who, each for their own reasons, are calling for new early parliamentary and presidential elections), they are determined to recall any future government resulting from the current convocation of the Parliament as soon as the first opportunity arises.

ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS

After all the political-institutional complications, impasses and aporias, the discussion of the financial and general economic repercussions of the deep political crisis in France finally came to the "agenda". Apart from the astronomical public debt of 3416 billion euros in the first half of 2025 (euphemistically 115% of GDP), many economic experts (regardless of their eventual political color) are much more concerned about the budget deficit of almost 160 billion euros (5,8% of GDP), which threatens to exceed 200 billion in the coming year. The proverbial obsessive-compulsive statisticians even calculated that the impeachment of the Barnier government cost France 0,3% of GDP growth this year, with a slight increase in unemployment by 0,1%.

On the domestic front, general political uncertainty has led to a drastic drop in investments (three quarters of small and medium-sized enterprises have frozen all investments in 2025, and two thirds of them do not expect an increase in the volume of business this year).

Internationally, the situation is even further from rosy. Less than two weeks ago, the rating agency Moody's lowered France's credit rating, and the Standard and Poor's agency is also preparing to do so by the end of the week. In addition, interest rates on French debt have risen on the international bond market, which may put many large French banks in serious doubt if there is a mass sale of these financial assets that large French banks have in abundance in their portfolios, especially bearing in mind that they are central financial authorities that lend money to the economy and the population.

On the EU soil, German Chancellor Mertz is most afraid of a potential financial and economic crisis in France, because Germany, despite the government's voluntarism, has entered an economic recession, and the euro has been steadily falling against the US dollar for weeks. In other words, the situation is sufficiently alarming that, according to some opinions, the interference of the IMF in the introduction of budgetary and fiscal discipline in France is not excluded.

At the moment, everyone in France seems to be holding their breath, at least until Wednesday evening, in anticipation of Macron's "taking charge" and his final decision. Cautious, certainly Dante-minded optimists, believe that this is "probably the last round of the political crisis in France" or at least they hope so, although the good old Sioran taught us a long time ago that "to hope is to deny the future".