Striving for dominance

John Mearsheimer (1947), a retired full professor at the University of Chicago, is a big name in the field of international relations. Since the beginning of the eighties, he has published several relevant books that significantly contributed to a better understanding of specific aspects of international politics and provided the basis for more effective foreign policy management. The latest book How States Think. The Rationality of Foreign Policy (How states think. Rationality of foreign policy), he wrote with Sebastian Rosato (1972). It is particularly important because of the recent conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, conflicts which have brought geopolitics, foreign policy and war back into the center of public and scientific attention, but also because of the frequent opinion among the professional and lay public that world leaders who start armed interventions are megalomaniacs, irrational or even insane.

...

Mearsheimer and Rosato are members of the realist school in international relations, a school that relies on the rationalist tradition in the social sciences, although not on rational choice theory itself. (The title of the book is a probable allusion to Jarvis's book How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics from 2017). Realism asserts that the primary goal of every state is to protect its own survival and security. This stems from the nature of international relations, because in them there is no higher authority or legal order that you can refer to if someone threatens you. The countries are left to themselves, and the most important thing for them is to survive and be safe. Only when these two things are secured, states can start dealing with other issues (protection of the human environment, economy, economy, culture, etc.). The ultimate goal of every state is to gain as much power as possible and become a hegemon, because such a position ensures security and survival. Mearsheimer calls this "offensive realism," thereby challenging the idea of ​​"perpetual peace," suggesting that the pursuit of dominance and the nature of international politics generate a continuous struggle for power. (The definition of offensive realism was presented by Mearsheimer in the book The tragedy of great power politics from 2001)

Considering that states operate in this environment, the book How States Think deals with the question of whether states are rational in their international activities, especially when they enter into armed conflicts. Part of the answer to this question comes from the definition of realism in international relations. As soon as states deal with their security as a primary issue, they must be rational. But that's just the initial premise. In order to say that states are rational, it is necessary for states to base their foreign policies on reliable (credible) theories, and base their actions on a comprehensive discussion (deliberation) in which a large number of actors participate.

Reliable theories in international relations are based on realistic assumptions, have empirical support and have no internal contradictions. For example, the theory of the clash of civilizations and the theory of racial superiority are not reliable as guides in fusion politics, because they are based on wrong assumptions and have no empirical foundation. Against them, realism or the theory of liberal international order are credible. The adoption of credible theories is crucial for a rational foreign policy, as it enables decision-making based on valid and reliable information.

WHAT HISTORY TEACHES

Exploring the events of the 20th and 21st centuries (the book does not go beyond the beginning of the 21st century), Mearsheimer and Rosato analyze in detail 14 foreign policy decisions (events) by which states started a war, entered into an armed conflict with another state, or intervened militarily in another country. Attention is drawn to the author's position on some decisions that are still considered irrational today, but for which the authors claim the opposite. It is about the decisions of Germany to start World War I in 1914, Japan to attack America at Pearl Harbor and Hitler to attack the Soviet Union in 1941. The authors believe that these decisions were rational, because they resulted from a thorough discussion that took place within the political and military circles that made such important decisions.

In other words, despite the prevailing opinion that the leaders of Germany and Japan were irrational in these cases, and everyone else blindly followed their irrationality, the book shows that such decisions resulted from a broader consensus within the ruling elite. Moreover, all decisions were derived from credible theories of international relations, in this case from the theory of the balance of power. This theory suggests that states make decisions to prevent a power imbalance that could harm their interests or to take advantage of opportunities to increase their power. The premise of the theory is this: if war with an opposing power is inevitable, then it is strategically wiser to start the conflict earlier, when the attacker is in a better position, rather than later. According to the authors, this was the guiding idea of ​​Germany in 1914, and of Japan and Germany in 1941.

The authors also consider irrational decisions. These include the decisions of Imperial Germany to build a powerful navy with the intention of challenging Britain at the beginning of the 20th century, Britain not to reform the army to fight on the European continent in the late 1961s, America to invade the Bay of Pigs in 2003 and Iraq in XNUMX. In each of those cases, the government's policy was based on some unreliable theory, arguments driven by emotions, or it came from a non-deliberative process, i.e. with significant opposition from a part of the ruling elite.

Mearsheimer and Rosato conclude the book with a discussion of a question that has long troubled political scientists, both those dealing with domestic public policy and those dealing with international relations. It is about the question of the morality of such attitudes. Moral arguments in international relations suggest that rational decision-making should lead to peace and cooperation among states. This critique assumes that if states consistently use rationality, they will recognize that power struggles and war are counterproductive and should therefore be avoided. The authors, however, say that this view equates rationality with a moral imperative for peace. The political theory presented in this book is not normative, but explanatory. It deals with questions kako se states behave and not as it should be to behave. Rationality is treated here as a decision-making process based on logical analysis, strategic calculation and evaluation of the most effective means to achieve specific goals or interests, without necessarily considering moral or ethical consequences. There is only one reason why the authors, as realists in international relations, look at rationality in this way - this is how states behave in international relations.

SEARCHING FOR ANSWERS

As expected, the book does not mention the current conflicts that have occupied the daily attention of the academic and political public for the past two years. But like any good book, How States Think it offers theoretical tools with which we can (if we accept them) explain both current and anticipated armed conflicts in Asia. It is about the Russian-Ukrainian war, the armed conflict in Gaza and a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan. After reading this book, the reader can only try to answer these questions if he asks himself whether the decisions to start a conflict are rational, ie. whether they are grounded in reliable theories and whether they arise from a thorough discussion of the justification of the conflict.

The translation of this book into the Serbian language would be useful to all those who directly or indirectly deal with foreign policy, and it is necessary for them to understand the behavior of great powers and armed conflicts. However, the importance of the book goes beyond foreign policy and international relations. When geopolitical issues come to the fore, they have the power to influence the international and national economy, as well as the public and domestic politics of all countries, both those involved in current geopolitical processes and those that are not. This book is therefore also useful for economists, public policy analysts and political analysts.

The author is a full professor at the FPN in Belgrade