Pedro Sanchez in recent years has repeatedly found himself where European prime ministers would prefer not to be - in open conflict with their own allies. This was first clearly seen in the case of Gaza. Madrid recognized Palestine in May 2024, has been vocal in its criticism of the Israeli government's actions and has increasingly insisted that international law must apply equally to allies and adversaries. Later, the same pattern emerged in disputes over military spending, migration, and the US-Israeli attack on Iran.
Sanchez does not question the place Spain in the European Union and NATO, nor support for Ukraine. This is precisely why his departure is not a simple rejection of alliances. It is about the readiness to criticize allies when he believes that the rules that Europe itself refers to have been violated, even if this means a conflict with Washington, Israel or some of the European partners.
CONDEMNATION OF THE INVASION OF IRAN
When the US and Israel launched a joint military attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, the reactions of the leading European countries mostly remained on calls for de-escalation, protection of civilians and a return to negotiations. Pedro Sánchez called the attack unilateral and assessed it as a violation of international law. Madrid did not allow the Rota and Moron bases, which are also used by American forces on the basis of a bilateral agreement, to be used for operations against Iran. Fifteen American military planes soon left the bases.
Explaining the decision in parliament on March 25, 2026, Sanchez said all flight plans related to operations in Iran, including refueling flights, were also rejected.
"Spain is a sovereign country and does not want to participate in illegal wars," said Sanchez.
However, this did not mean aligning with Tehran. From the beginning, Sánchez condemned the Iranian attacks on the countries of the region, as well as the very nature of the Iranian regime, and on March 6, 2026, he drew a clear distinction, saying that Spain condemns the Iranian regime's repression, especially against women and girls, but that it "does not justify the violation of the international order." He also criticized the fact that the attack was not preceded by a consultation in the UN Security Council.
Sánchez's stance immediately provoked reactions from the right. The leader of the conservative People's Party (PP) Alberto Núñez Feijo accused Sánchez of "going against the security of Spain" for his electoral interests, while Santiago Abascal, the leader of the far-right Vox, called him "the best friend of the Ayatollah in Europe."
THE GAZA QUESTION AND THE CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL
The conflict over Iran was new, but Sanchez's argument was not. Before Tehran, Gaza was the issue where that pattern was first clearly seen. Spain recognized Palestine as a state in May 2024, which provoked a sharp reaction from Israel, which withdrew its ambassador from Madrid for consultations and described the recognition as a "reward for terrorism".
From the beginning, Sanchez has clearly condemned the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas, while insisting on Palestinian statehood. However, as the Israeli operations in Gaza continued, with the increasing number of civilian casualties and the deepening of the humanitarian disaster, it became significantly harsher. In July 2025, he stated in the Congress that Europe "is not doing enough to stop this genocide" and added that what is against Putin in Ukraine must not be allowed to Netanyahu in Palestine. This further sharpened the argument that he would later use in the case of Iran - international law does not make much sense if its application changes depending on who violates it.
In September 2025, Madrid went further and announced nine measures "to stop the genocide in Gaza", among which are the legal strengthening of the arms embargo on Israel, the ban on the use of Spanish ports for ships transporting fuel to the Israeli army and the ban on the entry into Spanish airspace of planes carrying military material for Israel.
"It's one thing to protect your country, and quite another to bomb hospitals and starve innocent children," Sanchez said.
The reaction of the Israeli government was harsh. Two members of the Spanish government were banned from entering Israel, while Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accused the Sanchez government of anti-Semitism and claimed the prime minister was using the Gaza war to divert attention from domestic problems. Madrid called the accusations false and slanderous and said it would not give up defending international law and human rights.
Spain was not entirely alone in this, but it did belong to the group of European countries that went the furthest in putting pressure on Israel. Gaza thus became one of the most impressive examples of how far Madrid has distanced itself from the majority of its European partners in certain issues. Additional turmoil has already occurred in relations with the United States of Donald Trump.
CONFLICT WITH THE USA
When NATO adopted a new goal in 2025 that would require members to spend five percent of their GDP on defense and broader security needs by 2035, Madrid refused to commit to it. Sánchez argued that Spain can meet its obligations with allocations of around 2,1 percent of GDP.
Because of this, Trump repeatedly attacked Spain, called its attitude "terrible", threatened trade consequences, and at one point even suggested that it be kicked out of NATO. Sánchez, in contrast, insisted that the contribution is not only measured as a percentage of GDP. At the summit in Ankara on July 8, 2026, Sanchez stated that Spain had around 3000 soldiers deployed in NATO missions and operations at the beginning of June, and called the country's commitment to the Alliance "complete and unequivocal".
Disputes with Trump, disagreements with part of the European partners and already strained relations with the Israeli government at the end of July intersected on another issue - migration.
photo: ap photoBOUNDARIES AND JOY WITHOUT BOUNDARIES: Moroccans on Spanish soil
MOROCCO THE HARDEST TEST
Migration is another issue on which Sanchez's Spain has increasingly diverged from the dominant European approach in recent years, which includes stricter asylum rules, more efficient return of migrants and tighter border controls. In 2026, Madrid launched a program for people who had lived in Spain before January 1 of that year, and whose status was not regulated even though they met the conditions. By the end of June, almost 1,2 million requests had been submitted, and the government's argument was simple: people who already live and work in the country should enter the formal system of work, taxes and social security.
Such a policy was already causing resentment among European governments, but the debate exploded at the end of July when Ceuta, a Spanish city in North Africa, came under pressure from a massive influx of people from Morocco, and on July 30 and 31 the situation escalated. According to Spanish figures, around 72.000 people entered Ceuta, although Rabat reports lower figures. The vast majority were soon repatriated or returned to Morocco. At the beginning of August, the president of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas, spoke about approximately one hundred deaths during the crossing attempt.
The causes of this surge are not entirely clear. A few weeks earlier, Spain's Supreme Court had restricted the practice of returning people who reach Ceuta by sea, and the misinterpretation spread on social media that entering by swimming practically guarantees staying in Spain.
Even after the crisis, Madrid did not directly accuse Rabat of organizing the mass transfer. But doubts about Morocco's role are not without reason.
In 2021, when Spain received for treatment Brahim Galli, the leader of the Polisario Front, which seeks the independence of Western Sahara (a territory that was a Spanish colony until 1975 and most of which Morocco claims as its own), Rabat reacted violently. The Moroccan authorities temporarily eased border control, and in just a few days, between 8000 and 9000 people entered Ceuta. The European Parliament later assessed that Morocco used migration as a means of political pressure on Spain.
The following year, Sánchez made a major U-turn towards Morocco, evaluating the Moroccan plan for the autonomy of Western Sahara as "the most serious, credible and realistic basis for resolving the dispute", while insisting that the final solution must be acceptable to both sides and within the UN. At the same time, Spain and Morocco opened a new phase of relations, but this year's crisis reopened the question of how much this 2022 turn really stabilized the relationship with Rabat. At the same time, the crisis very quickly ceased to be only a Spanish-Moroccan affair.
Several European governments have called for stronger protection of the EU's external border, and Italy has been among the loudest critics of Sanchez's regularization. The European Commission offered Madrid additional help, but also emphasized the need for greater cooperation with Morocco and other transit countries.
And the images from Ceuta were quickly and widely used politically. Donald Trump described the situation as an "invasion", warning American voters about the consequences of "open borders". At the same time, Israel's National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir ironically "congratulated" Sanchez for his policy towards migrants and told him that if he already shows so much concern for the residents of Gaza, he should "open the doors of Spain" and receive those who want to leave.
In a few days, Ceuta brought together almost all the fronts on which Sánchez is fighting: relations with Trump, Israel, Morocco and the increasingly restrictive European debate on migration.
photo: apDISAPPOINTMENT: The refugees did not reach Europe
LONELY IN EUROPE THAN IN SPAIN
Sanchez's policies often appear from the outside like those of a lone European leader. However, in Spain the picture is different - on the topics where he diverges from his European partners, Sánchez is actually very close to the majority mood of his own society.
Iran is the clearest example. In research 40dB. conducted a few days after the start of the war, 68,2 percent of Spaniards opposed the US-Israeli attack, and 53,2 percent supported Madrid's decision not to allow the use of the bases for operations against Iran. Sanchez's reaction was approved by 42,2 percent of the respondents, there was also resistance to the war among the voters of the right, and only Vox voters supported the intervention in the majority.
A 2025 survey by the Elcano Institute showed that 82 percent of Spaniards consider Israel's actions in Gaza to be genocide, while 78 percent support the recognition of a Palestinian state. Donald Trump didn't enjoy much sympathy either. On a scale of 0 to 10, Spaniards gave him an average rating of only 2,5, while 61 percent of respondents expected that his presidency would have negative consequences for Spain.
However, this does not mean that Spain is anti-American or that it is turning away from NATO. On the contrary, 85 percent of Spaniards want the country to remain in the Alliance, three quarters support the continuation of European military aid to Ukraine, and 57 percent believe that Europe should invest more in defense. At the same time, the public is much more divided when an increase in the Spanish military budget means less money for other public needs.
Such a combination of attitudes explains quite well the space in which Sánchez also moves: strong support for European and Atlantic alliances, but resistance to the idea that membership in the alliance means accepting every demand from Washington. And that reflex is not new in Spain.
When the government of José María Aznar sided with George W. Bush in 2003 on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, opposition to the war in Spain was almost unanimous. Immediately before the intervention, CIS recorded 91 percent of citizens against the war. That's why it was no accident that Sanchez brought out the slogan "No to war" again this March and directly connected Iran with Iraq. In his address on March 4, he recalled that the Spanish could simultaneously condemn Saddam Hussein and reject a war they considered illegal - just as today they can reject the Iranian regime while opposing the bombing of Iran.
The comparison created a problem for PP. In the first days, Feijo defended the overthrow of the Iranian regime and attacked Sanchez for his attitude towards the allies, but already during the first week he started talking about the need to "stop the war" and to find a way out through negotiations. In the PP itself, according to "Paisa", there was discomfort because the discussion was returned to Aznar and Iraq, a situation that the Spanish right-wing is still not particularly comfortable with.
Sanchez quickly recognized this political advantage. "No to war" became the central message of the PSOE, and his address on March 4 collected more than nine million views on social networks. Already in April 2026 in Barcelona, together with Brazilian President Lula da Silva and other progressive leaders from several countries, he tried to transfer that political momentum to the international stage by gathering them around the answer to the strengthening of the extreme right.
That is an important part of his position today. At a time when the European left is on the defensive, and right-wing and radical-right parties determine an increasing part of the continental debate on migration, security and military spending, he tries to use the Spanish experience as proof that a different policy still has electoral and social support.
A July 2026 survey by the state-run Center for Sociological Research (CIS) put Sánchez's PSOE at 33 percent, as much as 7,9 points ahead of the conservative PP, but something else is more important: his most conspicuous foreign policy positions—on Iran, Gaza, Trump, and NATO—have social support that is clearly wider than the PSOE's electorate.
Perhaps that is why it is wrong to see Sanchez's foreign policy only as a series of his personal jumps out of the European order. Much of what he says and does is based on attitudes that exist in Spanish society even without him: attachment to Europe and NATO, but without automatic alignment with Washington, a more open attitude towards migration and significantly less patience for European double standards in the Middle East.
Sánchez's skill may lie precisely in the fact that he managed to turn that set of attitudes into a recognizable political line. Only after him will it be clearer if he really took Spain to a different place in Europe or if he was just the first to recognize that it was already there.
Only in August: Save three thousand dinars on the annual subscription to the digital edition of "Vremena"! Take advantage of the discount here and support independent journalism.
