Divorce with retention

The Croatian National Assembly, the self-proclaimed legislative body of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, gave the international community 16 days to find a political solution to the crisis in the country on March 60 at its session in Kiseljak. That decision practically prolonged the revival of Croatian self-government, thus delaying the complete splitting of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian National Assembly explains this decision with the desire not to prejudge the final solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, behind this readiness for political cooperation, one would rather say, is the awareness that the creation of a third entity would lead to the shipwreck of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would result in harsh sanctions from the international community, and even the use of force by SFOR and the central authorities. in Sarajevo.

Croatian political leaders, in addition to encountering the unwavering stance of the international community not to allow the territorial reorganization of BiH, also faced difficulties within their own – Croatian – territories. They first clashed with the management of a significant number of profitable companies operating in Herzegovina and central Bosnia, who reserve the right to accept or reject the situation in which their businesses could find themselves, if sanctions were imposed and economic relations with other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be severed by the revival of self-government. , but also with Croatia, which did not officially support this decision.

ARMY BE CAREFUL: With a lot of caution, the decision was received in the police and military units controlled by the HDZ. The Croatian component of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina removed the federal insignia and put the insignia exclusively of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus making it known that they no longer count on partnership with the Bosniaks in the entity, but also that they have no intention of separating from Bosnia. All Croatian officials in the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Command of the Army also resigned, but the new Minister of Defense in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately appointed new officials who do not belong to the HDZ.

However, the problem is that the civilian commander of the HVO is a member of the State Presidency from among the Croatian people. Since Ante Jelavić, otherwise the president of the HDZ, was dismissed from the position of member of the presidency, and a new one was not appointed, he "took" the position of civilian commander with him and handed it over to the president of the self-proclaimed Croatian Parliament, Marko Tokić. Since Tokić, who was recently removed from office by the high representative, is not recognized by the international community and the Alliance for Change, the Croatian part of the army is left in a quandary - whether to accept the newly appointed commanders who do not have the majority support of the Croatian people, or to remain loyal to the parastatal structures.

In any case, an independent Croatian army would not even be able to support itself, because in case of disobedience, it would be left without funds from the budget, and the aid from Croatia no longer goes through parapaths, but directly into the federal budget.

WITHOUT SPECIAL CONNECTION: The decision of the Croatian National Assembly to extend the beginning of self-government was influenced to some extent by the American ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Thomas Miller. On that day, he met with the mayor of Mostar, Neven Tomić, a high-ranking HDZ official, and representatives of all Croatian political parties operating in that city. Apparently, he encountered a unique attitude of Bosnian Croats regarding the criticism of the new OSCE election rules. These rules, which were imposed by the OSCE mission in BiH before last year's elections, enable the representatives of the House of Peoples in the Federation of BiH, in which decisions are made by consensus, to be elected by representatives of cantonal assemblies of all nationalities, and not only Croats, as was the case in previous elections. This change enabled Bosniaks, as a larger nation, to use their votes to influence the profile of Croats who will be elected to this house of parliament. From that moment on, HDZ's dissatisfaction with the structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina began, which recently led to the creation of the Croatian National Assembly.

Thomas Miller said after the mentioned meeting that he understands the dissatisfaction of the Bosnian Croats and that he will try to overcome this problem. The understanding of the American ambassador gave a signal to HDZ that there is a possibility to solve at least part of the problem through negotiations. The same evening, news arrived from Kiseljak that the separation operation was being postponed for two months.

At the same time, an announcement came from the Republic of Croatia, from the President of the Parliament Zdravko Tomac, that this country will terminate special relations with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the explanation, it is said that Croatia wants to establish good relations with the whole of BiH, and not only with one part, because this contributes to the splitting of the neighboring country, which it considers extremely important for the stability of the Balkans. The political forces around the Croatian National Assembly welcomed this decision, announcing that no one benefited from the agreement, and that it only gave rise to accusations against the Croats that they wanted to annex this entity to Croatia. Bosniak political factors also welcomed the announcement, interpreting it as a necessity to preserve the integrity of the country. It can be stated that these are the same goals of the Alliance for Change and the Croatian government specified at the recent meeting in Slavonski Brod, which aim to denigrate the effect of the special relations between Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia in international circles. After the international community rejected the Croatian ideas for the reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the growing affection of the international community towards Serbian politics, and that on both sides of the Drina, wants to be reversed by rejecting ideas about any partialization of relations.