At a recent plenum of the Chinese communist parties it was announced that nine top military leaders had been replaced, including President Xi Jinping's deputy on the Central Military Commission, General He Weidong. Russian analyst Dr. Yevgeny Goncharov estimates that this is the biggest purge in the Chinese army since the Cultural Revolution six decades ago. He states that at the beginning of November, he was at the plenum of the Central Committee of the KP Kine it was obvious that 16 generals "disappeared" from the Central Committee.
General He was also a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Party, and he was dismissed, like other top generals, due to "serious errors in work and violation of party discipline". Although there were speculations about these changes before, the fact that they were confirmed in the final communiqué from the plenum shows that the Chinese leader wants to further emphasize that "the party commands the gun", as Mao Zedong so vividly said.
At the party congress three years ago, a total of 33 generals of the Chinese army were elected to the Central Committee - 22 as full members and 11 as candidates. It has now been announced that the nine have been dismissed, arrested and sentenced, while it is not known what happened to the others. The party leadership presents this major purge in the army as a routine crackdown on corruption, but many believe that this is only part of the explanation.
Xi Jinping remains at the head of the Central Military Commission, which now has four members instead of the previous seven. The new member is General Zhang Shenmin, who replaced former Vice President and Politburo member He Weidong. However, for unknown reasons, General Zhang was not elected to the party's Politburo.
While in the West there is speculation about "disappearing generals", in Beijing the role of party supervision and the way of controlling the army is actually being redefined. It is not just a purge, but a gradual process of transferring control mechanisms from humans to algorithms. Artificial intelligence is becoming a key loyalty filter among both military and civilian leaders.
CORRUPTION ALGORITHM
Analysts focused their attention on other indicators from the plenum. It is noticeable that the number of members present was lower than in previous years: out of 205 members of the Central Committee, only 168 participated in the three-day work of the plenum. A similar situation was noted among the candidates for members of the Central Committee who do not have the right to vote, but can participate in the session. Out of 171 candidates, only 147 attended. As many as 37 members of the Central Committee and 24 candidates did not appear, which has never happened before. No official explanation has been given, at least not to the public, and it is hard to believe that everyone fell ill at the same time and missed the most important political meeting of the year.
In recent years, checks and purges have been carried out in party and administrative structures, perhaps more widely than in the army. Over the past two years, about three million personnel have passed through "organized supervision", that is, through the "VI loyalty filter". Of course, not all of them were dismissed or ended up in prison, but a significant number did.
The Chinese press occasionally publishes news of the convictions of high-ranking party and state officials, along with the usual accusations of large-scale corruption. Yunnan Province Party Secretary Li Yifei was convicted of abuse of office and ties to local clans; Justice Minister Fu Zhenghua received a life sentence, as did Deputy Public Security Minister Sun Liyun. Deputy Party Secretary Shanghai Gung Dao was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Chinese Minister of Agriculture Tang Zhenjiang was recently sentenced to death for a bribe of 38 million euros.
Even the son of former Prime Minister Li Peng was deposed and sentenced to several years in prison, which shows that even family ties are no longer a guarantee of protection. Everything is decided by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, headed by Politburo Standing Committee member Li Xi.
THREE PHASES OF CHECKING
In order for a case to reach the Central Commission for Discipline Verification, it is preceded by a long process of verification, in three stages.
The first phase includes an analysis of expenses, travel, contacts and social activities — from public gatherings to private dinners. All this makes up the so-called "closeness network". This process is carried out automatically, with the help of artificial intelligence, so any functionary can be found under "digital screening". About 80 percent of them never even find out that they were under surveillance.
The second stage is an internal conversation, formally voluntary, but unavoidable in practice. This is not a police interrogation but an intelligent test of cooperation: it is checked whether the official is ready to cooperate and whether he sees his own mistakes, for example, in spending state funds or maintaining ties with groups that spend more than they earn.
If he denies everything or refuses to cooperate, the third phase follows: the suspect remains in isolation, without a lawyer and without contact with his "colleagues". At that stage, the final decision on the fate of an individual or a group is made, and the courts that take over the case generally only formally confirm the decision made.
The biggest sin is no longer just bribery and corruption, but the creation of groups that act beyond state and party interests.
That's why a new proverb has become increasingly common on social networks in China in recent years: corruption is rust, faction is cancer. Perhaps therein lies the answer to the question of why there are so many purges in the military and party leadership in China.
