Donald Trump and the future of world order

In the history of American presidential elections, it is almost impossible to remember that the arrival of one man in The White House caused so much attention, tense anticipation, as well as heated decisions "for and against", as is the case with the re-election Donald Trump for the 47th president of the only remaining global superpower, the United States of America, and in the American society itself, which is divided along many axes, as well as in the entire world: in every part of it, somewhere less and somewhere more. Compared to Trump's victory over the opponent Hillary Rodham Clinton in 2016, what were only cracks in the previous world order this time grew into fault lines, sometimes chasms, in the relations between key players, "essential actors" (Morton Kaplan). increasingly competitive international order and world system. The changes are so profound and fateful for the future developments on the stage of international life that the period of only ten years ago seems to us to be decades away, almost pastoral, with predictable movements - to mention only the corona virus pandemic, the Russian-Ukrainian war and the conflicts in the Middle East with by the threat of the spread of hostilities to the entire region of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula, that is, everything that took place and is taking place in the meantime, sometime from 2016 until today.

The international liberal order, primarily of the countries of the West, is searching despite the internal crisis, and is even more resistant to the challenges posed by, broadly speaking, the shift of power towards the other poles - the countries of the East and South, which are increasingly organized against the decades-long dominance of one part of the world. Strict sensu, from the end of the Second World War until our days, there were "two and a half orders", the western liberal, the eastern socialist and organizationally loose movement of non-aligned countries, the so-called Third world. With the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the victorious West remained on the stage: for a short time - a decade in the historical course of time is almost like the blink of an eye - it was believed that one view of the world did not have a sufficient alternative, that the end of the history of the development of ideas and ideas about the primary organization had been reached which society (Fukuyama). The 1990s were marked by an unprecedented spread of liberal social relations, market economy, values, it seemed, to all parts of the world... In that period of complete domination by the USA, Western and allied countries, this model of social domination was followed and imitated even by nations and countries that were during the Cold War the bitterest opponents of liberal capitalism.

photo: ap photo

ROOSEVELT'S EXIT FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

When it comes to the United States, it was also a complete triumph policies of liberal internationalism, whose foundations were laid by the greatest American president of the 20th century, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. With his famous measures in the thirties of the last century, President Roosevelt pulled out not only the economy, finances and the labor market, but also the entire American society from the abyss of the Great Depression and at the same time, after decades of hard struggle, he reoriented the USA towards leading world politics. Namely, he went beyond the basic tenets of the Monroe Doctrine, which at that time proved to be too narrow for the new world that was created during and after the Second World War. In addition to the firm position of a large part of American public opinion, Roosevelt also had great opponents against his policy of leaving the Western Hemisphere in the America First Committee movement, which was founded in 1940 by members of the then scientific, political, economic and social elite. USA. History, as is known, has confirmed this grandiose turn and the correctness of the policy of liberal internationalism: this order, at least as a regional order of Western countries, during its eight decades of existence, through certain institutions and through them, included almost all nations in the common interest and countries of the world.

In contrast to the much narrower concept of world order offered by Woodrow Wilson at the end of the Great War, FDR overcame the shortcomings of the Versailles order and the system of collective security of the League of Nations and replaced it with the active inclusion of a social component, which was later embodied through the UN system and international financial institutions in the interest of of all peoples and countries. The idea of ​​FD Roosevelt's Four Freedoms was aimed simultaneously at the well-being and well-being of each individual and the human race as a whole. Perhaps the answer to the question about the unusual longevity of the international liberal order should be sought in this. This emerging regional order and world system, with its overall political, security, economic, financial, social, as well as cultural infrastructure, networked the world for the first time in the history of international relations and was almost universally accepted by almost all subjects, states, international organizations, down to individuals. The principle of free trade was, of course, the most beneficial and suited the richest and most powerful. From the US point of view, America needed the world then, but the world also needed America, as someone willing and, moreover, able to shoulder the burden of world leadership. This was particularly evident, as we have already said, after the Cold War, when the market economy, the rule of law and liberal democratic values ​​were, at least declaratively, accepted in most countries and peoples of the world.

At the beginning of the nineties, the world was made almost "safe for democracy", as Wilson advocated at the beginning of that same "short twentieth century" (Eric Hobsbawm). In the meantime, after the "unipolar moment" (Charles Krautheimer) "gone with the wind", the challenge to the leading power in the system was posed by new poles of power: first of all, China, then militarily strengthened Russia, populous India, Brazil, which is too rich in raw materials... Naked geopolitical competition it has again come to the very center of world affairs. Is there still, as FDR believed 80-plus years ago, as well as more or less almost all American presidents after him, the necessary agreement of American national interests and liberal internationalism in the conduct of its foreign and security policy? The answer to this question is the first, unavoidable step in a deeper understanding of ongoing processes and divisions, both in the United States itself and in terms of analyzing its relations with its closest allies and key rivals in the world system.

In other words, can it be answered in the affirmative, as was the case in the first decade after the Cold War, that "what is good for the world is also good for the United States of America" ​​(Walter Russell Mead)? Or, as the leaders of General Motors emphatically shouted on the waves of economic globalization, that what is good for General Motors is also good for America... At that time, one could also hear that, for example, Boeing is no longer an American company, but has grown into global company, thereby rejecting the binding of this economic colossus to national affiliation. During the 1990s, the denationalization and de-sovereignization of economies in the countries of advanced liberal capitalism reached a peak. In some cases, even the mere mention of national economic sovereignty was taken as a sign of advocating retrograde, outmoded views. Economic and economic forces were interpreted and self-explained as a kind of supremacy that transcends any identity affiliation. The well-known NAFTA agreement is, when we talk about North America, the most prominent such example of moving production to areas that encourage the fastest and highest degree of capital fertilization and bring dizzying profits to corporate giants who, simply put, did not pay any attention to the domestic, in this case, the American market. of work.

photo: ap photo

"POST AMERICAN WORLD" AND HIS CHALLENGERS

Already in the first decade of the 21st century, an increasingly open geopolitical competition in the world order of power was hinted at, and soon seen: as Farid Zakaria lucidly observed, America continued to develop and grow, but in the so-called "post-American world" its challengers , above all China, progressed faster... With the consequences of the dynamic information revolution, until then a more or less generally accepted consensus on institutions, structure and processes, the multi-decade global the system is called into question. It should not even be mentioned here that the values ​​of the international liberal order were actually never generally accepted in all parts of the world, states, nations and, especially, in different cultural-civilizational groups and circles. Starting with the United Nations and the Security Council, through international financial institutions, the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization, the shift in power and the upheaval of the previous balances and agreements in the relations of the world's greatest powers permanently threatened the foundations of the post-war world system.

It should not be surprising that, not only in the USA but throughout the world, the outcome of the elections in this still the most powerful country in the world was awaited with unprecedented attention. At this moment, it is still too early to predict with great confidence to answer at least four questions: first, what does Donald Trump really want, then, what can he really do, then, what can he do, and finally, what should Donald Trump absolutely not do do?

Probably due to the large number of unknowns, "black swans" (Nassim Taleb) or "gray rhinoceroses" (Michelle Walker), even a personality like Trump could change his initial intentions about the fundamental transformation of American society and the "quick resolution" of international conflicts. ongoing conflicts. Donald Trump would certainly not be the first American president to be pulled by a chain of unexpected events in a completely different direction than intended.

Nevertheless, theoretical-traditional foundations and patterns can help, if not exactly in predicting, then in a deeper understanding of the history of the American presidency, especially when it comes to conducting foreign and security policy. First, it is important to eliminate the mistake that is often repeated in our public speech and professional circles, regarding not making a distinction between isolationism and unilateral policy. Only, perhaps, it can be said about Thomas Jefferson that to a certain extent he advocated and implemented the policy of isolationism - non-interference by military force in the internal affairs of other states - as well as that he vehemently condemned state support for American business in making deals and opening new markets outside the USA. Jefferson warned that such a symbiosis of state and business would most threaten American democracy in the country itself. All other calls of American presidents "to put America first" or to "make it great again" are essentially unilateralist, sovereignist and protectionist programs to actually cooperate with the world, but to take care of national interests first and foremost. own country. Even when the US Senate refused to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations, and thereby, among other things, marked the withdrawal of this country from Wilson's liberal internationalism, during the twenties of the 20th century, during the mandates of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, this country led no isolationist rather than unilateralist policy in which American capital robustly opened new markets and conquered sources of raw materials.

Only the policy of liberal internationalism pursued by the USA from FDR to the election of Donald Trump as the president of this country assumed the open rejection of the idea and system of the balance of power as the leading principle of the organization of the international order and the world system, creating and promoting an international order based on legal norms, free trade, human rights... Since the time of George Bush Jr., successively through Barack Obama to Donald Trump, the USA has been reassessing the expediency of the previous policy of liberalism in various ways. internationalism.

NATIONAL INTEREST AS "THE LEADING STAR"

It should be said here that even the closest American allies were occasionally confused by the frequent changes of course of the mentioned presidents. In the conditions of the rapid growth of the power of other challengers in the world order and increasingly fierce geopolitical competition, questions were also raised as to how objectively the existing order, with all its institutions, processes and values, better suits the national interests of the challengers than the national interests of the USA... Trump wondered that, occasionally openly accusing American allies of not bearing the burden of their own security proportionately and pointing out that American taxpayers invest too much in the defense of other nations, which at the same time have a colossal surplus in trade relations with the United States. When he enters the White House on January 20, 2025, Donald Trump will certainly not give up on strengthening the American economy and labor market through the introduction of tariffs, quotas and all other protectionist measures available to a country. His emphasis and insistence on bilateral relations of "bare transactionalism", along with the rejection of multilateral security and economic-financial and trade arrangements, of course, does not mean that the USA will automatically lead a policy of isolationism, but it means precisely relying on forms that have already been used many times in American history and actions of unilateralism. The indicated changes call into question not only the internal relations in the world system and the liberal international order on the so-called to the "collective West" but fundamentally change relations in an order in which, instead of a system of collective security and universal international organizations, the classical balance of power as the neuralgic core of the world order is declining in status nascendi.

If we agree to the transformations in American society that are no longer heralded only by the Republican Party, but by the entire party as well move at the head of which Trump put himself, they win and continue to attract supporters and supporters by spreading fear of immigrants, "alienated elites", then in relation to the outside world pragmatism is actually key, relying only on American national interests as a "guiding star" ( Morgenthau).

If it can be claimed that Trump's domestic policy is to some extent guided by the impulses of Jacksonianism, national, "highlander populism", then the theoretical-traditional roots of his policy and the framework of relations with the outside world are much closer to Hamiltonian pragmatism. In other words and in short, such a simultaneously simple and complex view of the world is based on the initial assumption that "economic policy is a strategy" (Walter Russell Mead), that the main task of the state in foreign and security policy is to support corporate business and investors in competition with competitors around the world. Alexander Hamilton himself started from the belief that without a stable marriage between the "White House and Wall Street" America cannot develop successfully. Today, advocates of conducting American policy in accordance with Hamilton's teaching believe that national security directly depends on the success of economic policy, at home and towards the outside world.

Therefore, Donald Trump's promise to end the Ukrainian war in 24 hours should not be too surprising. A foreign policy guided by prudent pragmatism of economic and security interests and, at the same time, unencumbered by ideological-value goals of "fixing" other states and peoples, advocates of this view believe, can find quick solutions. No, of course, within 24 hours! According to this understanding, we talk and negotiate with everyone who can contribute, regardless of ideological affiliation and existing alliance agreements... Roughly, such an approach relies on three pillars: first, the key importance of trade, then nurturing a strong national identity and patriotism, along with behavior in the spirit of "enlightened realism" in the understanding of international relations. Another question is, namely, how much the personal quotient of the 47th President of the USA, read in the language of the theory of the presidency - his presidential style, as well as the strategic dynamics of today's international and global relations, will allow Donald Trump to Hamiltonianly unite the undoubted power at his disposal with the wisdom of managing the river of events …

The author is the founder and director of the Center for US Studies at the FPN University in Belgrade

(This text was created as a result of the project "Center for the Studies of the United States of the Faculty of Political Sciences - The First Twenty Years" which is implemented by the Center for the Studies of the United States of the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Belgrade, and is financed by the Department of Media, Culture and Education of the Embassy of the United States of America State in the Republic of Serbia. The Department of Media, Culture and Education of the United States Embassy in Belgrade, nor the United States Government are behind the content of this project or take responsibility for it.)

News talk

Broliarchy

California Republican Congressman Darrell Issa criticized Secretary of State Antonio Blinken for holding mental health counseling sessions — and a "cry session" — for employees upset over Donald Trump's election victory.

The post-election blues of American liberals leaves its mark in the language as well. The director of "Tesla" Elon Musk and the pharmaceutical billionaire Vivek Ramaswamy, who were appointed by Trump to lead the new Department of Government Efficiency, were called broligarchs by "Arkansas Times", "Atlantic" and "Guardian". In this statement, oligarchy, minority rule and bro, an abbreviation of the word brother (brother), a slang code for communication in male society, like our word burazer (adopted Turkish or Persian words brother). Now the girls call each other "brother".

In the post-election blues bro+oligarchy it signifies something more dangerous than plutocrats, those whose wealth buys power, as The Atlantic calls PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel, a mentor to Vice President-elect JD Vance.

Investigative journalist Karol Cadwaladr for "The Guardian", for example, offers 20 instructions "How to survive broliarchy": in the third she writes that McMaschism (McMuskism) – McCarthyism (McCarthyism) on steroids (political persecution + Trump + Musk + Silicon Valley surveillance tools). At 18, he says Elon Musk is (only) thinking about flying a SpaceX rocket to Mars and looting rare minerals before anyone else gets there. And in 19. (Take a piss, humor is a weapon), Karol Cadwalladr, presented in the subtitle and as a veteran of the defamation court (libel court) is - according to the formula plexus, nexus, sex - Ilona Muska, the father of ten children from three women - allegedly worried about the population collapse - sent to Freud's couch: "Any man who feels the need to build a rocket is not too confident in his masculinity..."

Milan Milošević