Aleksandar Vučić's regime is, in its essence, counterfeit and imitative because it has no capacity to produce anything of itself. Except for the damage. That's why taking people out onto the streets with the same scenography set up by the students: orderlies dressed in fluorescent vests, like, keeping order (because, like, the police aren't enough). However, after four weeks of the performance of paid people and the imitation of support for the president by all citizens, certain dilemmas arise - from the perspective of the regime.
First of all, what is the purpose of all this? Okay: in order to have something to fill the contents of the propaganda and cannibalistic newspapers of the regime; to embolden a slack electorate and discourage civil protest; to meet the elections in a race.
The energy of funeral processions
The problem, however, is that all of this is going a bit too smoothly. The regime - with the connivance of the top police and propaganda media - talks about the massive mobilization of citizens and the accompanying enthusiasm. In reality, things are different.
Those who get money, some frightened and blackmailed people, and, probably, also a part of those who willingly support the president of all citizens, took to the streets. In the middle of Belgrade (on Voždovac), in that way, with the personal presence of the president of all citizens (especially those who break the jaws of female students), several thousand people were expelled, which for a party of 700 thousand people - as they claim - is not a very impressive number. In fact, for them, it is a frighteningly small number of people.
Additionally, funeral processions often have more energy than what is made or paid to walk. People do what they are paid for, but it is not seen that they enjoy their work. And that is the next problem for the regime. Or, as Hegel would say, there is nothing without passion.
There is no energy in the regime's ranks because reality is seeping through the cracks of the alternative reality that the regime has set up. There is hardly anyone in this country who does not know that the regime, lacking ideas, is trying to corrupt the citizens. Those who do not know this, or hide this fact from themselves, will still vote for the president of all fans of metal bars. However, how many of those people are there today, especially since the students traveled the country on foot (which, despite the propaganda, is not forgotten)?
Election campaign
The regime, therefore, is measuring the moment when it could call elections. In other words, he is looking for a moment that would allow mass theft. Why is that not possible today?
Because the citizens are seriously angry and would seriously engage in catching thieves in flangranti ("in the very act", "with hands in jam", i.e. at the moment when he steals, which would create certain inconveniences for the thief). Citizens on the move - at least that's how the regime's accountants reason - would have an advantage over those who haven't even taken a starting position yet.
But the lack of enthusiasm along with, undoubtedly, tiresome walking on buses everywhere (regardless of the video), and the absence of a clear idea, call into question the effectiveness of such imitative moves. To that extent, the meaning of the entire operation boils down to pictures from those gatherings that are distributed in propaganda magazines.
Civil conflict
Finally, this small analysis suggests that the sporadic voices about a possible civil war in Serbia - even the Croatian Prime Minister publicly stated that possibility, the only thing is that he did not offer any argument - are completely arbitrary. Yes, it could be said that Serbian society is split, fragmented in a bad way (for 13 years the regime has been destroying society, sociocide), but it is very questionable whether it can be said that it was divided, even "deeply divided".
Among other things, the division implies ideologically opposing positions, and here the ideological perspectives are, quite simply, skewed (hence the left and right, and above and below gathered under the student hat). The regime itself is not ideologically structured - it can do anything, but it doesn't have to do anything (although war criminals, provided they are Serbs, are near and dear to it) - but kleptocratic.
Most of the loot is poured into the pockets of the group from the very top, and the stake is lowered as you go towards the bottom. People are, of course, perishable goods, and they are ready to do literally anything for money. But not even for fifty euros per head. It takes (at least) two to make war. "North" and "South" in the American Civil War, "White" and "Red" in the Russian Civil War, Falangists and Republicans in the Spanish Civil War, Chetniks and Partisans in the Serbian.
Here, however, we have the regime on one side and the citizens on the other, and a civil war cannot be started in such a division. The division here is simply called a dictatorship. These unfortunate people who the regime, like bears, walks around Serbia and buys them with small amounts of money, will not accept weapons either because of their age profile or because of the absence of passion (they will not die for a fool).
The president of all thugs, to that extent, remains suspicious police officers and unsuspecting thugs - the top of the army shows servility, but is the "commander-in-chief" allowed to bet on the army in a conflict with citizens? - and that is not enough for a civil war.
