Many, even seemingly serious people are ready to, quite confidently, especially on social networks, express their opinion on what the political opposition in Serbia should and should not do. It was said back then that the former Yugoslavia had 20 and a half million football coaches, and today Serbia inherits a hundred thousand political and marketing experts who behave as if they were advisers to the world's biggest politicians and parties for decades, and now - from retirement - they offer expertise for free. It is less of a problem that the mentioned (most often) complain, than that the opposition too often makes decisions based on the current mood of Twitter-activists and social network inertia and "moral panics".
It is certain that there is no simple answer to the question of how, at least on a symbolic level, to deal a serious blow to the progressive government, which has on its side a bottomless financial barrel, all the instruments of force, humiliated institutions, humble media, criminal organizations, and even the undisguised support of most of the most important foreign centers of power.
A football allegory is also often used: even the best coach could not determine a winning strategy and tactics on a field where the opponent has six or seven more players, bribed referees and a crowd that throws lighters and sometimes axes at you. Perhaps the question would not be so difficult if Vučić had not been allowed - with the silence, and even the complicity of many of today's moral rabble-rousers - to so easily manage to swallow up both the state and society.
Futile attempts
It cannot be said that much has not been tried and done: numerous protests were organized, some very massive, elections were boycotted with the aim of drawing the attention of the domestic and international public to electoral irregularities, efforts were made to animate the international public, and countless corrupt and other affairs were documented, the civil opposition united, and there was even a hunger strike. The non-governmental sector was activated, public figures - sacrificing a lot - joined the fight against the "stolen state", there are also some important social groups, such as students.
In the December elections, for the first time, concrete evidence of numerous electoral irregularities and frauds was presented: electoral theft of enormous proportions was exposed. Relatively numerous protests against election fraud were also held. But all that was not (was) enough to seriously shake the progressive regime.
A false "moralistic" dilemma
Of course, criticizing the opposition is an important thing: its mistakes, which are many, should be highlighted. But, at the same time, you should keep in mind the "bigger picture" and use logic. For example, some "experts" were killed to prove that it was the opposition's fault that it took a break from protests during the holidays. Maybe so, but what if - as could be expected - the number of demonstrators was reduced to a symbolic measure? And even if the number of demonstrators was maintained or increased, what would happen? Would that change something significantly, lead to repeated elections? Let's be honest - it wouldn't.
Under the influence of social networks, a "false moralistic dilemma" appeared in the opposition, some say: should the mandates won be accepted or should they be renounced in protest. If he renounces them, the opposition will receive some Twitter applause for "consistency", but it would again, like back then after the boycott, find itself on a begging stick. If the boycott had any meaning, in terms of clearing things up on the opposition scene, this would be pure whim.
Relative electoral success in desperate circumstances was achieved, among other things, because the parliamentary opposition was somewhat consolidated thanks to the money it received from the budget. Does anyone think that politics can be conducted without money? In addition, it was also important to act in institutions, not only domestic but also international. The latter enabled better communication with certain Western lovers of democracy who now better understand what is happening in Vučić's Serbia.
Something has moved.
There is no doubt that it is difficult to find a shortcut in overthrowing an authoritarian, malignant and overly rich regime. It is difficult to shake a government of a similar character even in countries that are members of the EU, and that do not have such a traumatic immediate past as Serbia. Look at Hungary, for example. We should give up on "promises made lightly" and clearly say that we all have a long, hard road ahead of us, on which we should be, so to speak, yogic patient.
The opposition said that it will continue the post-election struggle in parallel on three tracks. It is not a genius, but a logical and only possible solution. Internal pressures will consist of civil protests and gatherings (they need to add color and fragrance), and by submitting applications and complaints to the competent institutions (this is necessary as much as it is doomed to failure in advance).
In addition, in cooperation with international partners, the pressure will continue on, first of all, European countries, but also the USA, with the aim of giving up support for a regime that poses a threat not only to democracy in Serbia, but also to the entire region. The messages coming from the West these days are encouraging, more critical than ever, although they are far from what critics of the regime here would like to hear, in relation to the "situation on the ground".
Therefore, there is no room for immoderate optimism, but also for disincentive pessimism. Until a few years ago, Serbia was a dead society and practically had no opposition. Something happened in the meantime. And there are local elections ahead of us, in the spring.
