The Prime Minister of Serbia floats like a feather on social networks and hits like a grenade from a self-propelled howitzer. Both, for the most part, end in self-harm. But what if Ana Brnabić is an extremely cunning politician, similar to the inscrutable sensei Splinter from Ninja Turtles? More precisely - is she an ally of ProGlas in the deep underground, from where she spreads subtle and subversive messages?
Here is an example. In response to ProGlas list basic and concrete minimum conditions for new elections, Brnabić calls Vučić a "tyrant, psychopath, mafia boss, thief" and similar names. She further admits that she and her party partners are, to put it mildly, a group of political minors whom the President of Serbia is bringing to state positions by the hand. That's why, when a line is drawn under everything, it turns out that Vučić is solely responsible for redrawing the will of the people. Brnabić, of course, puts the above in defense of his boss, but in reverse, he sums up the views of all his opponents in the shortest possible terms. In this, he goes even further than ProGlas when he "honors" him with epithets that, as far as is known, members of this group do not use.
So much for Ana Brnabić. It's ProGlas's turn. In principle, no one has anything against his basic list of demands. Problems arise on a practical level.
First, ProGlas does not say anything about how and by what means the List of Conditions can be achieved. They are nothing new and already exist in public life. But as before, there is no clear implementation plan.
Two - the issue of the upcoming local and possibly Belgrade elections also arises. What if the regime completely refuses or only partially fulfills the List of Conditions? Will ProGlas, which called on citizens to go to the elections on December 17 in the spring, stand for a boycott? Does he mean the resignations of already elected opposition MPs and councilors and, in general, what would it look like?
Finally - if the democratic opposition achieved a historic result during the progressive era in the parliamentary and, conditionally, Belgrade elections, can it be asked to give up the fight for power in Novi Sad, Niš and other areas? Especially after the Resolution of the European Parliament and the internationalization of the post-election crisis in Serbia? If it can, will it lead to the splitting of the opposition bloc and how will the citizens understand everything together?
So there are many questions, few answers. But to avoid misunderstandings, the fight for fair and honest election conditions must not be abandoned. The list of conditions of ProGlas should therefore be understood as a proposal of the initial platform for concretization and optimization in the dialogue with the opposition and civil society. Everything else is frivolous and leads directly to confusion.
